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1. Introduction 
The acronym BRIC was invented by the British economist Jim O’Neill from Goldman Sachs 
in 2001 as a catchy description of emerging economies worth investing in. The acronym soon 
took on political meaning as the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China met on 
the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the fall of 2006. This 
informal meeting marked the beginning of a framework for dialogue and interaction that now, 
nearly eight years and over 20 meetings between ministers and heads of government and state 
later, includes issues from international finance to health and from food security to education.
 The issue of interaction between the BRICS is interesting for several reasons. First, 
together the five countries (South Africa became part in the grouping in 2011, adding the 
capital S)
1
 involved represent over 40 % of the world’s population, over 20 % of the world’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and around 20 % of total world trade. Even in a situation 
where the formation of a strong bloc is unlikely, such numbers warrant our attention. Second, 
whereas in the first few years of BRIC interaction the central debate was whether it could be 
treated as an analytical category (Armijo, 2007), today the debate seem to be focused on 
whether the BRICS can build on their momentum and become a coherent force shaping 
international relations in the years to come (Stuenkel, 2013a; Mielniczuk, 2013; Brütsch and 
Papa, 2013). In addition to warrant a study like this in itself, this also underlines the 
importance of the first reason. Third, the two factors that played a crucial part in the formation 
of the grouping – the economic crisis in the developed world and the concurrent economic 
stability in the emerging world – has somewhat disappeared over the last couple of years. The 
U.S. and Europe are starting to recover, while growth is to a varying degree slowing down in 
the five BRICS countries (Follath and Hesse, 2014). As of now the grouping show no sign of 
curbing the level of interaction (Stuenkel, 2013a), but it is important to analyze the grouping’s 
foundation as the initial phase has come to an end.      
 The BRICS has thus been chosen as research topic because it is important from a 
policy perspective, specifically because their concerted efforts towards issues of global 
significance may have profound consequences – not only for the BRICS countries themselves, 
but for global governance as well. In this respect, understanding the inner dynamics of their 
interaction is critical.          
                                                 
1
 In the following, when I use BRIC I refer to events that took place before South Africa became part of the 
grouping. When I use BRIC(S) I refer to events taking place both before and after. It is also used in contexts 
where South Africa is relevant, but where they were not part of the grouping when the issue at hand took place. 
BRICS is used to refer to events taking place after South Africa became part of the grouping, but also as the 
general term for the framework.  
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 To this end I ask the following question: What keeps the BRICS from robustly 
cooperating? By robustly cooperating I mean frequent coordination of policies as a means 
towards realizing mutual interests, which – as the analysis will show – as of today does not 
exist between the five countries. The reason for posing the research question in such a way is 
that it allows me to identify conditions that need to be in place in order to robustly cooperate, 
as well as structures that can facilitate it, and then argue to which extent these conditions and 
structures are coming into place or not.       
 The thesis is structured as a case study and limited to observations on BRIC(S)’ 
interaction towards reforming International Financial Institutions (IFIs). More specifically, 
their aim at reforming the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group 
(WBG), in addition to their attempts at creating their own IFI structures, such as a BRICS 
development bank and a financial security net in the form of a Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement (CRA). The reason for this limitation of observations is due to considerations of 
quality and space. Including more observations would mean a less in-depth analysis, or 
moving beyond the pages allocated to this thesis. I will return to the reasons for specifically 
choosing BRIC(S)’ interaction towards reforming IFIs in my research design chapter, but the 
main reasons are that this is the area that is most interesting and relevant from a policy 
perspective, the area that has received the most attention from the BRIC(S) and the area 
where their interests are believed to be most compatible. The latter reason means that this is 
the area on the BRICS agenda that is most suited for an in-depth analysis. The data employed 
is limited to various types of documents, such as statements and communiques, press releases, 
media sources, documents from governments and organizations, and expert opinion.  
 Three hypotheses are analyzed; where the first two mostly function as a means to 
evaluate to which degree the antecedent condition (Van Evera, 1997, p. 16) for the third 
hypothesis, overlapping interests, is present.       
 First, cf. above, the main criticism of the BRICS, especially from Western observers, 
is that the five countries are far too diverse to ever represent a coherent force, and that what 
separates them heavily outweighs what unites them  (Stuenkel, 2013a). This is the most 
obvious reason for why cooperation is difficult, and for explaining a future potential 
breakdown and wholesale defection. Most importantly, compatible interests are prerequisite 
for cooperation. If we do not find any compatible interests, we do not need to bother 
evaluating other explanations. My first hypothesis therefore makes the claim that the BRICS 
have incompatible interests.        
 Second, even though BRICS interaction often is described as cooperation, this might 
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not be the most accurate description of their relationship. What we observe, and what is 
referred to as cooperation in some of the literature, op-eds, news, and by the BRICS 
themselves, might better resemble a state of harmony. In such a situation policy coordination, 
which is the definition of cooperation, is superfluous in order to realize mutual interests 
(Keohane, 1984). It also describes situations where there are no gains of deceiving your 
partners and defecting on the agreement while they continue to cooperate (Oye, 1986). If 
harmony is the case, the BRICS framework is likely no more than a dialogue platform that 
functions by identifying mutual interests where policies already align. Of course this may 
ultimately increase the prospects of realizing mutual interests, but only to a limited degree and 
in few situations.
2
 As above, if harmony is the case, this is the obvious reason for why they do 
not robustly cooperate. My second hypothesis therefore makes the claim that the BRICS have 
harmonious interests.         
 Third, given overlapping interests (meaning mutual, but not harmonious) regime 
building is viewed as the key explanation for, and strategy for increasing the prospects for, 
multilateral cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986). A regime’s principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures help reduce the issues that states trying to cooperate face. Asking 
what keeps the BRICS from robustly cooperating therefore suggests that regime features are 
weak in the BRICS framework. My third and final hypothesis is therefore that the BRICS 
have overlapping interests, but weak regime features between them.   
 The analysis of BRICS interaction towards reforming IFIs only partly supports that the 
BRICS do not robustly cooperate because of weak regime features. Its antecedent condition, 
overlapping interests, is only identified in a couple of the observations. Rather, harmony of 
interests and the BRICS not actually needing to coordinate their policies in any significant 
degree, seems to account for just as much, perhaps a bit more, of the explanation. 
Incompatible interests carry some explanation, but less than the other two.   
 Much depends on the ultimate outcome of the grouping’s most ambitious projects, the 
development bank and (although in a lesser degree) the CRA, but the findings here indicate 
that the five countries to a large degree focus on issues where their gain of interacting might 
be substantial, but still relatively small, and where their autonomous policies might have 
facilitated the same result anyway. It also suggests that when overlapping interests are 
present, they lack the adequate structures that could increase the prospects of successful 
policy coordination.            
                                                 
2
 Joint statements and demands concerning a specific issue where policies already align might for instance 
increase the prospect of success vis-à-vis solitary, but yet more or less identical, claims.  
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 The thesis is structured in the following way: in chapter two I provide a brief overview 
of past evidence, emphasizing the main points and arguments concerning the state of the 
BRICS framework. Chapter three provides the thesis’ theoretical foundation. In this chapter 
concepts such as cooperation, harmony and international regimes are presented. This chapter 
also presents my hypotheses. In chapter four I present my research design. Here I elaborate on 
my method, observations, variables and purpose, and give a description of how the data is to 
be analyzed. Chapter five constitutes my analysis. This chapter is divided into four 
subchapters, one for each of the main issues I have identified under the umbrella of reforming 
IFIs. Chapter six concludes the thesis: in addition to summarizing the main results I briefly 
reflect on the thesis’ implications and limitations.      
 Since the empirical evidence not is presented chronologically as a single narrative of 
the BRICS trajectory, limited to issues concerning reforming IFIs, and since the BRICS 
framework is a rather new political phenomenon who some readers might be unfamiliar with, 
I conclude this introduction with a brief description of the BRICS framework and how it has 
evolved.            
 However, before I turn to this, some quick economic and political facts about the five 
countries is useful: in economic terms, China is the largest with a GDP
3
 of $13.37 trillion. 
This makes them the second largest economy in the world, only behind the U.S. India then 
follows with $4.96 trillion, Russia with $2.55 trillion, Brazil with $2.42 trillion, before South 
Africa completes the list with $595 billion (CIA, n.d.). China thus has a larger economy than 
the rest of the BRICS combined, while South Africa is significantly smaller than the other 
four. China has also had the strongest growth rate. From 2004-2012 the Chinese economy 
grew with a mean GDP of 10.5%. India followed with 7.8%, Russia with 4.4%, Brazil with 
3.9% and South Africa with 3.6%.
4
 The recent financial crisis affected all five countries, but 
China and India showed better resilience than the remaining three. Brazil, Russia and South 
Africa, for instance, all had negative growth in 2009. In 2013 the Chinese economy grew with 
an estimated 7.6 %. India’s grew with 4.7%, Brazil’s with 2.5%, South Africa’s with 2%, and 
Russia’s with 1.3% (CIA, n.d.). Outlooks for 2014 are uncertain, but prospects for emerging 
and developing economies have become more sober throughout the first six months of the 
year (Elliot, 2014).          
 All five countries have in various degrees employed an export-led path to growth 
                                                 
3
 Figures are given in purchasing power parity (PPP). 
4
 These numbers have been calculated by using the World Bank’s overview of world annual growth (WBG, 
n.d.a) 
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(Casertano, 2013), and trade makes up large parts of their economy. Measured as percentage 
of GDP in 2013, the relative value of Brazil’s exports was the smallest, with 12.4% of their 
total GDP coming from selling their goods and services on the international market. The 
numbers for the others were 29.6 % for Russia, 25.2% for India, 25.1% for China and 30.6% 
for South Africa (CIA, n.d.). Russia and Brazil, and to a large degree South Africa, are mainly 
natural resource exporters, while China and India have a stronger manufacturing base. The 
latter has also become a large exporter of services (Ibid.).      
 With regards to their current account balance,
5
 China has the second biggest surplus in 
the world, second only to Germany. Russia also has a relatively large surplus, while India, 
Brazil and South Africa have relatively large deficits. Regarding reserves of foreign 
exchange, China is world leading with $3.82 trillion. Russia, Brazil and India also have 
relatively large amounts, with $515 billion, $378 billion, and $295 billion, respectively. In 
absolute terms South Africa’s reserves are more modest, with $48 billion (Ibid.).  
 Regarding political system, Brazil, South Africa and India are democracies with 
pluralistic societies. Russia is also a democracy, but has of late become more and more 
authoritarian with growing restrictions towards pluralism and free speech. China is an 
authoritarian socialist republic, ruled by one party.       
 Regionally, all five countries can be said to hold positions as leaders, since they 
dominate their neighbors in terms of “power over resources” (Schirm, 2010).6 Globally, China 
and Russia are in another position than the other three, since they have permanent seats and 
veto rights in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). All five countries are, however, 
oriented towards getting more influence internationally, and share a “wish to assume 
leadership roles in global governance” (Ibid.), and to redeem economic power into political 
clout.            
 So, after two consecutive meetings between BRIC foreign ministers on the sidelines of 
the UNGA, first in September 2006 and then again one year later, the first standalone meeting 
between them was hosted by Russia, in Yekaterinburg in May 2008, with the aim to identify 
areas of shared interests where the countries could interact. The meeting was fruitful and the 
foreign ministers concluded by emphasizing “the prospects of the BRIC dialogue based on 
mutual trust and respect, common interests, coincidence or similarity of approaches toward 
                                                 
5
 A country’s current account balance is the result of the country’s net trade in goods and services, plus net 
earnings, and net transfer payments to and from the rest of the world. 
6
 The reach of this dominance is however different from country to country and generally larger for Brazil and 
South Africa, which don’t have as obvious competition in close proximity as Russia, China and India do, which 
region’s in varying degrees overlap.  
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the pressing problems of global development” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, 2008a). The most pressing global problem at the time was the financial crisis, and 
it was this, together with revisionist ambitions towards the IMF and the WBG,
7
 that became 
the focal point of the early BRIC interaction.       
 The second standalone meeting between BRIC ministers was between their finance 
ministers, which met in São Paulo on November 7 2008, on the eve of a G20
8
 meeting 
between finance ministers and central bank governors. The next day they stood united, and 
the G20 soon became the main platform for the BRIC to front their reformist views, 
emphasizing the need to give emerging and developing countries more clout in the global 
power architecture. The first summit between state leaders was held in Yekaterinburg on June 
16 2009. Shared views concerning financial and reformist issues dominated the agenda, while 
they also said that they had “agreed upon steps to promote dialogue and cooperation among 
our countries” (Presidential Press and Information Office, 2009).    
 In September 2009 the first real “BRIC victory” came when it was decided that the 
G20 rather than the more exclusive G8
9
 should be the main vehicle to deal with global 
economic issues. The world leaders also endorsed and committed to a change in the voice and 
representation structure in the IMF and the WBG in favor of emerging and developing 
                                                 
7
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, with the aim 
of rebuilding the world economy after WWII and to promote international economic cooperation. Today it 
consists of 188 member countries. Its purpose is to provide policy advice on financial and economic issues as 
well as financial aid to member countries in need (IMF, n.d.a). The World Bank Group (WBG) consists of five 
distinct organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), The Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The 
IBRD was the “original” World Bank, which was set up in Bretton Woods together with the IMF.  Today the 
World Bank (WB) refers to both the IBRD and the IDA. The WB is legally and financially separate from the 
other three institutions in the WBG. The WB’s purpose is to provide financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries (WBG, n.d.b). 
8
 The G20 was initiated in 1999 as a response to the global financial crisis of 1997-99, and functions as a 
cooperative and consultative forum on issues pertaining to the international financial system. Annual meetings 
have been hosted every fall since 1999. The forum first consisted only of finance ministers and central bank 
governors from the 19 major economies in the world plus the EU. But as a response to the most recent financial 
crisis, President Bush, in November 2008, invited all the leaders from the G20 countries to Washington D.C. 
Since then several meetings among G20 heads of state have taken place, and annual meetings are now being held 
every fall. The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors nonetheless continue to meet several times a 
year, often in conjunction with meetings in the IMF and WBG and in the build up to the G20 summits where 
they have a preparatory role (G20 Research Group, n.d.b) 
9
 The G8 consists of the U.S., U.K., Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Canada and Russia as well as the EU. The 
group, first referred to as the G6 (Canada and Russia became members in 1976 and 1998, respectively), has met 
annually since 1975 to deal with key economic and political issues both internationally and domestically. Since 
2005, Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa have been invited by the respective host to participate as 
well, often referred to as the Plus Five or the self-titled G5 (G7/8 Research Group, n.d.a; G7/8 Research Group, 
n.d.b.). At the G8 summit in July 2008, in Hokkaido in Japan, BRIC leaders met informally to follow up on the 
recent standalone meeting between their foreign ministers. It was here they decided to continue their interaction, 
and that they would have the first official summit the next year (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, 2008b).  
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countries (G20 Research Group, n.d.a).       
 In 2010 focus on intra-BRIC relations increased. Throughout the spring there was a 
range of sectorial meetings between the countries. Trade ministers and agricultural ministers 
met for the first time, in addition to officials and track II
10
 representatives. The second summit 
was arranged in Brasilia on April 15 the same year. Financial and reformist views still 
dominated the agenda, but the state leaders also discussed several new issues where they 
shared the same views and attitudes. The summit declaration, for instance, emphasized among 
other issues the need for a balanced outcome in the WTO’s current trade negotiation round 
(known as the Doha round), the importance of the fight against poverty, and condemned 
terrorism in all its forms (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010).   
 2011 was the most active BRIC(S) year, measured by the amount of meetings that 
took place between the countries. This was also the year South Africa officially became part 
of the framework. The third summit was held in Sanya, China, on April 14 2011. Here the 
first “action plan” was released, laying out how existing cooperation programs would be 
advanced together with an outline of new areas for cooperation (Gov.cn, 2011). By this time 
the BRICS framework had grown to include several issues beyond how and where to deal 
with the financial crisis and ways to get more influence for emerging and developing 
economies. Notable examples include initiatives aimed at food security, increasing intra-
BRICS trade and investment, and exchanges and information sharing in areas such as public 
health and science and technology.         
 The fourth summit was held in New Delhi on March 29 2012. Here the first ideas 
concerning the BRICS development bank was officially announced. And in June 2012, the 
first ideas of the joint financial safety net, in the form of a contingent reserve arrangement 
(CRA) that can provide liquidity to the BRICS countries in times of distress, surfaced. 
 The fifth and currently latest summit was held in Durban, South Africa, on March 27 
2013. The BRICS framework now covers issues from international finance to food security 
and from climate change to public health. It also includes several institutional levels, from the 
offices of BRICS heads of state and government to a range of government agencies and civil 
society.            
 The next meeting, which will start the second round of the summit cycle, is scheduled 
to take place in Fortaleza, Brazil, from July 15-17 2014.   
 
                                                 
10
 Track II refers to non-officials, such as academics, civil society, retired officials etc. 
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2. Past evidence and leading BRICS perceptions 
When discussing how the BRIC(S) framework was given a chance to come into existence, the 
existing literature seems to emphasize both external and internal developments. A very 
general explanation, and an example of the former, is offered by Fourcade, which argues that 
on a basic level the BRIC framework is “part and parcel of the process of economic 
exuberance that has channeled interest and capital toward these economies [Brazil, Russia, 
India and China] over the last decade” (2013, p. 264). This economic exuberance led to the 
promotion of O’Neill’s paper by Goldman Sachs, to follow up papers, popularization of the 
term in the media and finally the coming together of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China.            
 Other arguments, and an example of the latter, is Mielniczuk’s social constructivist 
approach, where he argues that a “discursive alignment” (2013, p. 1087) between the BRICS 
countries serve as explanation. A developmental-multipolar discourse, shared by India and 
China since the end of the Cold War and adopted by Brazil, Russia and South Africa by the 
mid-2000s, created the opportunity of converging interests which in turn explain the emerging 
BRICS political structure. Traces of the same explanation are also found in Babb’s (2013) 
argument. She claims that an alignment took place in the BRIC countries’ relationship to IFIs 
and their advice on economic policies, more specifically that Brazil and Russia came to join 
India and China’s relatively autonomous and independent stance by the turn of the new 
millennium.
11
            
 As the triggering factor, the literature emphasize to varying degrees the opportunity 
created by the financial crisis for the four emerging BRIC economies to assert themselves on 
issues pertaining to the international financial system. Stuenkel (2013a) for instance, argues 
that the crisis in the west, and the stability among emerging economies, created a legitimacy 
crisis for the international financial order that gave the four countries a platform to cooperate 
on and substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis the developed world.    
 Regardless of the underlying reasons for how the framework became a reality, many 
observers, especially Western ones, have since the beginning tended to dismiss the BRIC(S) 
                                                 
11
 IFIs, such as the IMF and the WBG are strong proponents of a set of converging ideas which has come to be 
known as the Washington Consensus. The Consensus, which Babb (2013) refers to as a transnational policy 
paradigm, functions as a prescription for developing countries and rests on economic ideals such as “prudent 
macroeconomic policies, outward orientation, and free-market capitalism” (Williamson, 1990, p. 1). The core 
practice of the Consensus has been the conditionality of policy reforms in exchange for loans to countries in 
economic crisis. Since the turn of the century the consensus has lost some of its prominence, and has especially 
been criticized for its “boilerplate policies”, where the same recipe is being used regardless of the context and 
situation. Over the last decade or so the paradigm has evolved, and the IFIs have modified its approach to the 
Consensus, also with regards to conditionality. The key features of the Consensus is however still very 
influential (Babb, 2013). 
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right away based on their diversity and internal antagonism, claiming that they neither have 
nor can represent a meaningful and coherent bloc in international relations. The diversity 
argument tends to be based on the differing economic and political realities in the five 
countries, which was briefly emphasized in the introduction.     
 A good example of this argument is Walter Ladwig’s, published as an op-ed in the 
New York Times, in the buildup to the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in March 2012:  
India, Brazil and South Africa are democracies, while China and Russia fall well short of that 
mark. Brazil and Russia are primarily natural resource exporters, while China and India focus 
on manufacturing and services. Although in terms of G.D.P. per capita the average Brazilian 
compares to his South African counterpart, the stark gap in living standards across the Brics 
nations is clear considering that the average Russian is twice as rich as a comparable Chinese 
citizen, who is in turn twice as well-off as an Indian citizen. In terms of the size of the 
grouping’s economies, China is by far the dominant player, whereas many commentators 
suggest that Russia and South Africa do not merit consideration as major emerging markets. In 
political terms, China, India and Brazil are touted as rising powers in global affairs, while 
Russia is steadily losing its claim to great power status and South Africa appears to be treading 
water. (2012) 
When it comes to BRICS antagonism, the same commentator proceeds:   
Within Asia, India and Russia are potential obstacles to China’s presumed regional dominance. 
At the international level, Russia, Brazil and India desire the emergence of a multipolar 
international system in which they are major actors, with the latter two seeking membership in 
an expanded U.N. Security Council. In contrast, China aims for a bipolar world in which it 
serves as the counterbalance to American power … Changes to the international system that 
increase China’s voice are welcome, while measures that dilute its existing status are not. Brazil 
has concerns that the growth of Chinese investment in Latin America is undermining its leading 
role in the region, and concerns about cheap Chinese imports have led Brasília to join Western 
nations in filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization over China’s artificially 
devalued currency. Even Russia has complained about China undervaluing its [Russia’s] oil 
exports; it also worries about Beijing’s increasing influence over resource-rich Siberia. (2012). 
There are, however, a couple of issues with this, and similar, approaches. First of all, looking 
only at the diversity and antagonism between the five countries runs the risk of ignoring what 
results the framework has created and how the intra-BRIC(S) relationship has developed over 
time. And as we shall see in the remainder of this thesis: the BRICS framework has not been 
entirely futile.          
 Second, the antagonism highlighted by Ladwig might be more theoretical than real, 
meaning that its actual effect might be smaller than what his text suggests. He also ignores the 
conflicts of interests the BRICS countries have with the West, and if this might actually 
outweigh the internal antagonism. Finally, Ladwig’s claim of China opposing a multilateral 
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international system is highly contested. It is true that China have not actively supported 
Brazil’s and India’s bid for a seat at a reformed UNSC, beyond supporting their aspirations 
“to play a greater role in the United Nations” (Presidential Press and Information Office, 
2009). It is also true that China wants to see the end of U.S. unipolarity, and contests its 
legitimacy in various ways. But this does not mean that China, as of now, want to serve as the 
second pole in a bipolar system together with the U.S. On the contrary, a central tactic in 
China’s strategy to end U.S. unipolarity has been to “[promote] the concept (if not always in 
practice) of multilateralism” (Schweller and Pu, 2011, p. 53). China is still in an early phase 
of their development, and Schweller and Pu therefore argues that “Chinese ideas about 
alternative world orders remain inchoate and contested within China itself” (2011, p. 52). 
 The Group of Two fad that gained traction some years back was also publicly opposed 
by China in 2009 when China’s then Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao said that “it is totally 
ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs” 
(Asia Times, 2009). We should be thus be careful in claiming that China would rather rise 
alone than in tandem.          
 With these limitations in mind, it is therefore a positive development that there seem 
to have been an increase in academic work concerning the inner workings of the BRICS 
framework over the last couple of years. This does not however mean that the latest literature 
rates the BRICS’ prospect for cooperation as particularly bright. Much of the sentiment in the 
above quotes is also found here. In their attempt to deconstruct the BRICS, Brütsch and Papa 
for instance seem to sum up the general impression when they say that: 
The “original” BRIC’s decision to underwrite a banker’s [Jim O’neill in Goldman Sachs] wager 
may have muted debates about the analytical value of an investment label. But few observers 
believe that well-choreographed encounters, handpicked initiatives, or lofty plans signify that 
diverse and potentially antagonistic states are either willing or able to translate their combined 
economic prowess into collective geopolitical clout. (2013, p. 301)   
They then go on to conclude that “although the BRICS’ pursuit of compatible revisionist 
goals can inspire coalitional cohesion sufficient for soft reformist targets, the prospects for 
community building remain elusive. If revisionist goals are absent, the BRICS struggle to 
operate as a coalition, their rhetoric notwithstanding” (2013, p. 327). I.e., when the BRICS 
aspire to act as a coalition in issues that don’t directly relate to changing the status quo 
(revisionism), such as in addressing the threats represented by climate change for instance – 
which is one of the cases Brütsch and Papa looked at – they have a hard time.    
 There are however those that, while perhaps not providing the same in-depth 
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conclusion, are more positive. Stuenkel (2013a) argue that the early gains
12
 from their 
interaction in the G20 and in the IMF led to increased trust among the four countries, which in 
turn led to intra-BRIC(S) cooperation in other issue areas. He sees this as evidence of 
substantial spillover effects, and therefore expects the interaction between the countries to 
continue also after the triggering effect of crisis in the west and stable growth in the BRICS 
countries may disappear. Mielniczuk, while not expanding any further, concludes his study of 
changing identities and converging interests among the BRICS by claiming that due to the 
intensive level of meetings and summits over last years the “BRICS might be considered one 
of the major long-lasting forces shaping the new architecture of international relations in the 
21
st
 century” (2013, p. 1075).        
 In sum the evidence of past includes a range of views and future expectations about, 
and for, the BRICS framework, ranging from the pessimistic to the optimistic. Before we 
move on it is important to note that these differing views rest on differing assumptions. The 
pessimistic approach must be said to assume a realist’s worldview: in an anarchic world based 
on self-help, where states are concerned about relative gains and the prospects for voluntarily 
cooperation generally is believed to be very low, it is inane to believe that such diverse 
countries as the BRICS will be able to form a meaningful and cohesive bloc or coalition. The 
optimists on the other hand must be said to assume a constructivist’s worldview: anarchy and 
diversity only matter as long as the BRICS let it matter. The five countries can decide to 
“ignore” such structural issues, which on the surface suggest that they will not be able to 
cooperate, and define their interests in a way that makes cooperation more likely to take place 
between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Most notably the IMF’s voting quota reforms in 2010. The reforms, which will be given thorough attention in 
the analysis, will, when implemented, give more power to emerging and developing states vis-à-vis developed 
states (IMF, 2010). 
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3. Cooperation in an anarchic world 
The BRICS framework is a mechanism that aims to help its creators identify and realize 
mutual interests. It is an example of intergovernmental interaction and joint action. In the 
search for theories that can help me explain this political phenomenon, what is very generally 
referred to as “cooperation theory” (Fearon, 1998) serves the best example. 
 Before I move onto specific theories, I start this chapter with a definition of 
cooperation, where Keohane’s (1984) understanding of cooperation as something different 
than harmony is employed. I then continue with the most salient theories regarding 
cooperation. I begin with the reason for its emergence, where I briefly discuss the realist and 
institutionalist approaches. I continue by discussing why it is difficult, where I refer to game 
theory, mainly the prisoners’ dilemma. I then conclude by discussing how and why the 
prospects for success can be changed, where I emphasize Oye’s (1986) three circumstantial 
dimensions and Keohane’s (1984) arguments concerning the functions of regimes.  
3.1 Defining cooperation 
In his seminal After Hegemony from 1984 Keohane argues that “intergovernmental 
cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded 
by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of 
policy coordination” (p.51). The last point is important. For cooperation to take place it is not 
in itself sufficient that the actions of one state serve another state’s interest. For example, 
Russia and China would not cooperate (by definition) with Brazil, India and South Africa by 
having the same policies as the latter three towards reforming the IMF. This would just be a 
consequence of Russia’s and China’s autonomous policy that happened to be positive for 
Brazil, India and South Africa.
13
 For cooperation to take place, Russia’s and China’s policy of 
IMF reform would have to be coordinated with Brazil, India and South Africa. Coordination 
means that “… adjustments [must] have been made in them [the policies], such that the 
adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some 
frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or overweighed” (Lindblom, 1965, p. 227). 
Coordination, Lindblom argues, has three avenues:  
“First is to achieve, with respect to any given set of values, a Pareto optimum – that is, a set of 
decisions such that no alternative set would benefit at least one decision maker and harm no 
other … Second is to mold values so as to reduce the possibility that a decision desired by one 
                                                 
13
 This two versus three dynamic in the BRICS is just an example for the sake of argument, and not based on 
actual dynamics. 
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decision maker carries adverse consequences for another … Third is to weigh conflicting values 
against each other and appropriately sacrifice amounts of some to amounts of others” (Ibid.) 
With this in mind, we see that cooperation would only be the case if Russia and China 
adjusted their policy on IMF reform aimed at making their policies more in line with the 
policies of Brazil, India and South Africa. This distinction can be outlined as in figure 1. 
(Before adjustments 
of policy are made) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(After adjustments of 
Policy have been made)  
Figure 1 Harmony, Cooperation, and Discord (Keohane, 1984, p. 53) 
Harmony is the case in the first situation described: an autonomous policy based on self-
interest automatically facilitates the goal(s) of others. In such a situation it is not necessary to 
cooperate since everyone’s interests is realized anyway. Cooperation is the case in the second 
situation: policies are adjusted so they become more compatible with one another. The model 
also highlights a third option, discord. This would be the case if Brazil, India and South 
Each actor’s 
policies (pursued 
without regard for 
the interest of 
others) are regarded 
by others as 
facilitating the 
attainment of their 
goals. 
HARMONY COOPERATION 
Are attempts made to 
adjust policies? 
Each actor’s 
policies (pursued 
without regard for 
the interest of 
others) are regarded 
by others as 
hindering the 
attainment of their 
goals. 
 
yes no 
DISCORD 
Do actors’ 
policies become 
significantly more 
compatible with 
one another? 
yes no 
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Africa regarded Russia’s and China’s policy towards IMF reform as hindering their own goal 
of reform. This does not mean a situation where Russia and China are against reform per se – 
since they then would have had incompatible interests with the other three countries. Discord 
is rather a situation where IMF reform is compatible with the interests of Russia and China, 
but where their policies for some reason do not contribute to the attainment of this goal. 
Discord thus describes a situation where fundamental interests between actors’ are 
compatible, but where there are no harmony between policies, and where attempts at 
cooperation, i.e. coordinating policies, either have failed or not been attempted at all. From 
this we also get that cooperation only materializes from a situation of discord, and only have 
taken place if policies actually have been adjusted.       
 In the analysis, I will refer to issues where fundamental interests seem to be in place, 
but where harmony is not the case, as issues where interests are overlapping. Only when 
interests are overlapping is cooperation possible or meaningful.      
 It is important to note that Keohane’s (1984) model is only relevant in a situation of 
interdependence, where states are mutual dependent on each other. Many relationships that 
may seem to be in a state of harmony, for instance, are more fundamentally in a state of non-
interdependence, where whatever each chooses to do will not affect the other in any 
substantial way – good or bad. In today’s globalized world most states live in a web of 
interdependence. The degree of interdependence between different countries however varies, 
and generally it is relative interdependence that matters, since interdependence matters 
because of the influence it conveys: state A will matter more to B than C, if state B is more 
interdependent on state A than state C.       
 Before we continue, it is therefore necessary to briefly discuss the level of 
interdependence between the BRICS. Generally the level of interdependence in the grouping 
is significant, though varying between countries. In economic terms, everyone is very 
dependent on China. All four countries have China among their top three destinations for their 
exports, and as their top provider of imports.
14
 None of the other BRICS, however, are among 
China’s top trading partners (CIA, n.d). In fact, among China’s top ten, only Brazil and 
Russia makes the list, on ninth and tenth place, respectively (China Daily, 2014). Brazil’s and 
Russia’s importance for China is however growing, since China increasingly depends on their 
                                                 
14
 Concerning exports the figures are as following (rank among all trading partners in parentheses): Brazil: China 
17% (1); Russia: China 6.8 % (2); India: China 5% (3); China, none of the other BRICS on top three; South 
Africa: China 11.8% (1). Concerning imports: Brazil: China 15.3% (1); Russia: China 16.6% (1); India: China 
10.7% (1); China; none of the other BRICS on the top three; South Africa: China 14.4% (1) (CIA, n.d). 
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commodities (Syed, 2011).          
 In total, the level of intra-BRICS trade is quite low, although rapidly growing. In 2012 
total trade between the five countries amounted to around $310 billion, which was 11 times 
higher than in 2002 (Standard Bank, 2013), but still only “10 % of their total combined trade” 
(Ibid.). A key criticism of the BRICS, as part of the general diversity argument, is that their 
economies are incompatible (Stuenkel, 2013b). However, the rising level of intra-BRICS 
trade suggests that there lies a potential beyond what the most sober assessments suggests. 
Increasing intra-BRICS trade is also a key priority on their agenda, and various initiatives 
towards this end has been discussed and established over the last few years.  
 Politically the level of interdependence is substantial. Because of their geopolitical 
size, especially Brazil’s, Russia’s India’s and China’s, they are key players in any truly global 
discussion or forum. Notable examples are the UN (although Russia’s and China’s veto 
powers perhaps creates an asymmetrical interdependence relationship with the other states), 
the IMF, the WBG, the G20, the UN’s climate change discussions, the WTO’s trade rounds, 
and issues relating to the global commons.  
 More attention towards the level of interdependence between the BRICS will not be 
given here. Both economically and politically, the general level of interdependence between 
the BRICS should be sufficient enough to employ Keohane’s (1984) model in a meaningful 
way. 
3.2 How cooperation emerges: the Realist and Institutionalist approaches 
On a general level it is sufficient to say that cooperation emerges because of the existence of 
common interests. If these interests only can be realized by cooperating, sometimes policies 
will be adjusted and cooperation will emerge. Keohane (1984) argues that two theoretical 
approaches have been especially influential in explaining how a relationship characterized by 
discord can shift to one characterized by cooperation: the realist and the institutionalist – in 
the following presented in a somewhat stylized form.     
 The realist approach assumes a world where states coexist in an anarchic world and in 
which sovereign states have “no system of law enforceable among them” (Waltz, 2001, p. 
159). States act in line with their perceived self-interest, and since these interests often are in 
discrepancy with other states’ interests, conflict and war ensues (Ibid.). The discord between 
states is therefore explained by fundamental conflict of interests between the states, and “any 
cooperation that occurs would be derivate from overall patterns of conflict” (Keohane, 1984, 
p. 7).            
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 On the other end of the spectrum lies the “institutionalist” approach, which 
emphasizes institutions and their role in international politics. This approach sees 
“cooperation as essential in a world of economic interdependence” (Keohane, 1984, p. 7) and 
claims that shared economic interests create “a demand for international institutions and 
rules” (Ibid.). They do not, however, believe that cooperation always will prevail, but are 
“aware of the malleability of interests and they argue that interdependence creates interests in 
cooperation” (Keohane, 1984, p. 8).        
 Both approaches are useful as a basic starting point for understanding how cooperation 
emerges, but both have severe limitations. The realist approach draws a rather simplistic 
picture of the relations among states. It sees cooperation as something strictly linked with 
power, where cooperation comes about as a balancing measure in the form of alliance 
building against the powerful or a perceived threat, or as something imposed or initiated by a 
hegemon to serve its interest (not meaning that it does not serve the other actors’ interest as 
well). The stylized version of realism thus fails to explain cooperation that is not part of a 
“larger struggle for power” (Keohane, 1984, p. 7) and the cooperation we see in fields of 
trade, financial relations, health etc. should in theory not exist. The institutionalists are 
criticized for the opposite, namely ignoring or giving the struggle for power to little attention. 
They risk being naïve about the harsh and brutish life in world politics, and are accused of 
being to idealistic, as well as too optimistic on statesmen’s behalf (Keohane, 1984).15  
 When it comes to their empirical value, Keohane (1984) argues that both approaches 
are right in claiming explanatory power. However, the correlation between dwindling U.S. 
power and the weakening of international cooperation in the late sixties, early seventies, 
strengthened the realist assumption of cooperation hinging on a hegemonic power enforcing 
it. Many of the cooperative arrangements instigated by the U.S after WWII nonetheless 
persisted, and Keohane therefore argues that “… the decline of hegemony does not 
necessarily sound cooperation’s death knell” (1984, p. 9), since institutions already 
established can take on a life of their own and continue to facilitate cooperation.  
 When going forward it is the premise of neo-liberal institutionalism that is employed. 
This accepts the notion of anarchy, and the problems this creates for cooperation, as well as 
                                                 
15
 Interestingly, Keohane – who drew heavily on institutionalism in After Hegemony and who is considered one 
of the founders of liberal institutionalism (or neo-liberalism) – was later accused of the opposite. Mearsheimer 
(1995) argues that liberal institutionalism by the early 1990s, due to repeated adjustments as a result of criticism, 
had been “swallowed up” by realism, and thus had become a mere “realism by another name” (1995, p. 85). 
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the notion of self-interested actors acting in line with their self-interests, but nonetheless holds 
that cooperation, with the help of institutions,
16
 can emerge without a hegemonic enforcer.  
3.3 Why cooperation is difficult: the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Collective Action 
A common way of explaining the general difficulties of cooperation in international relations 
is by using game theory, especially games where cooperation brings mutual benefit to both 
players, but where each can gain more by double crossing the other (Keohane, 1984). Among 
these, the most widely used game is single-play prisoners’ dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 
1984; Oye, 1986). Its influence is strong, and Keohane argues that “[it] is often taken as a 
paradigm for international politics, showing why discord is prevalent and cooperation rare” 
(Keohane, 1984, p. 69).         
 The logic of prisoners’ dilemma goes as follows: two partners in crime are being 
detained and kept separated. They know that if neither confesses to the crime they have 
committed, the police will only have enough evidence to keep both in jail for one year. If they 
confess they will get five years. The best strategy for the partners would thus be to cooperate 
with one another by not saying anything, serve the one year in jail, and move on. However, 
the police have also told both of them that if they rat on their partner and the partner does not 
do the same, the rat will be let loose and the partner will be sentenced to twenty years in 
prison. The best strategy would no longer be to keep silent, which now potentially means 
serving twenty years, and at least one year. By ratting and defecting on your partner, five 
years in jail is the worst outcome, and if you’re lucky and your partner keeps his mouth shut 
you will go free. The dominant strategy of both therefore becomes defecting by ratting, “… 
whatever his partner does” (Keohane, 1984, p. 68). The different outcomes become clearer in 
the matrix below.  
Table 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma (Keohane, 1984, p. 69) 
Column’s choice 
      Cooperate  Defect 
Row’s choice:  Cooperate  R, R (3, 3)17  S, T (1, 4) 
   Defect   T, S (4, 1)  P, P (2, 2) 
 
Payoff ordering: T > R > P > S  Condition: R > (S + T)/2 
                                                 
16
 “Institutions” have many connotations and definitions (Keohane, 1989). Keohane (1984) lends Young’s which 
holds that institutions are “recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge” (1980, p. 337). 
By this definition international regimes, which I return to later, can be understood as a specific type of 
institution. 
17
 The numbers in the parentheses indicate the payoff of each outcome, and thus the ordering of the payoff. 
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 “If both players cooperate with each other [keep silent], they receive the reward, R. If they 
defect [both rats on the other one], they are punished, P. If one defects while the other 
cooperates, the defector receives the benefit, T … while the cooperator receives the sucker 
payoff, S” (Keohane, 1984, p. 68). As noted above: R = one year in jail, P = five years in jail, 
T = go free, S = twenty years in jail. In sum the fear of being tricked make defection rather 
than cooperation the rational choice.        
 Keohane (1984) also emphasize Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action when 
explaining why discord is prevalent in international relations. Oye (1986) defines collective 
action as an N-person
18
 version of prisoners’ dilemma, but the logic behind it is a bit different. 
In collective action, the argument goes that “unless the number of individuals in a group is 
quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in 
their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interest” (Olson, 1971, p. 2). Whereas the problem in prisoners’ dilemma is 
the fear of being double crossed, the problem in collective action is free riding: those that 
have not contributed to the production of a good enjoy it on an equal footing as those who did 
contribute. This incentive to free ride occurs since the cost of contribution for each is 
significant, but close to insignificant for whether the good is produced. So, as with prisoners’ 
dilemma, the dominant strategy thus becomes to defect, and not contribute towards the 
production of the good (Keohane, 1984, p. 69).  
3.4 Strategies for reaching cooperation  
The logic of prisoners’ dilemma and collective action suggests that cooperation is irrational. 
However, there exist several factors, as well as strategies for adjusting non-cooperative 
conditions on these factors, that make cooperation more rational than the logic above 
suggests. Assuming international anarchy, and emphasizing non-altruistic cooperation 
between sovereign states, Oye argues that “three circumstantial dimensions serve both as 
proximate explanations of cooperation and as targets of longer-term strategies to promote 
cooperation” (1986, pp. 2-3). These three are: the structure of payoffs; the effects of time and 
iteration, described as the shadow of the future; and the number of actors involved in the 
cooperation. Differences in these three dimensions can account for the variation in success in 
cooperative attempts. Altering these dimensions will thus affect the prospects of success or 
failure.  
                                                 
18
N-person refers to the number of actors involved in a game, and is used to describe a game where the number 
of actors is arbitrary, but finite. In this case it generally means three or more. 
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3.4.1 The Payoff Structure 
The payoff structure refers to each outcome’s payoff in a potential agreement. In game 
theoretic terms it refers to “[the] benefits of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual 
defection (DD) and the benefits of unilateral defection (DC) relative to unrequited 
cooperation (CD)” (Oye, 1986, p. 4). In prisoners’ dilemma the payoff ordering for each 
player will always be T > R > P > S, which make the preference ordering DC > CC > DD > 
CD, and defecting the dominant strategy.
19
 However, the “magnitude of differences between 
CC and DD and between DC and CD can be large or small … and can increase or decrease” 
(Oye, 1986, p. 9). In the example I used above, the payoff for being the sucker (CD) was 
twenty years in jail, both defecting (DD) five years in jail, both cooperating (CC) one year in 
jail, and the rat (DC) got the ultimate payoff and was let loose. The incentive to defect is 
therefore huge, since the difference between being the sucker and the rat is relatively large 
and the difference between mutual cooperation and mutual defection is relatively small. But if 
the relative strength between the four outcomes changed, the relative strength of the 
incentives for either cooperating or defecting would also change. This means that changes in 
the magnitude between the different outcomes can influence the prospect for cooperation. 
 Changes in the magnitude can happen in two ways. The first way changes the game 
itself. Say that there is an increase in the value of CC relative to DC, a situation characterized 
as a prisoners’ dilemma might then change into the “less challenging” (Ibid.) stag hunt.20 Here 
the payoff ordering is CC > DC > DD > CD, but with the caveat that CC only will be reached 
as long as every player believes everyone will cooperate. A game of prisoners’ dilemma may 
sometimes also evolve into a situation resembling harmony, if the perceived gains of 
cooperation is enhanced while perceived gains of defection diminishes.    
 The second way is through iteration, where the “magnitude of the difference between 
CC and DD and between DC and CD in present and future rounds of play affects the 
likelihood of cooperation in the present” (Ibid.). Decisions concerning cooperation are not 
taken in a vacuum nor treated isolated. If the outcome of the present game influences the 
outcome of future games, the payoff from these games becomes part of the present payoff as 
well.   
                                                 
19
 D = Defect, C = Cooperate. The best outcome, DC, is thus you defecting and the other cooperating.  
20
 In stag hunt a group of hunters has surrounded a stag. If they all cooperate, they will trap it and enjoy a decent 
meal (CC). However, if one of the hunters breaks out of position to chase a passing rabbit, the stag will escape. 
The defector will ease his hunger for a while (DC), but soon be hungry again. Everyone else is starving (CD). If 
everyone gives up on the stag, and settles for the rabbit (DD), everyone eases their hunger for a short while. CC 
is relatively better than all other outcomes, but because “a rabbit in the hand (DC) is better than a stag in the bush 
(CD), cooperation will be assured only if each hunter believes that all hunters will cooperate” (Oye, 1986, p. 9).    
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3.4.2 The Shadow of the Future 
The shadow of the future refers to actors’ assessment of future cooperation, where the 
outcome of present cooperation is believed to influence the outcome of future cooperation. 
Oye argues that “the distinction between cases in which similar transactions among parties are 
unlikely to be repeated and cases in which the expectation of future interaction can influence 
decisions in the present is fundamental to the emergence of cooperation among egoists” 
(1986, p. 12). If a transaction only takes place once, it mirrors the single play prisoners’ 
dilemma where defecting is the dominant strategy. However, in iterated situations where 
states’ assume transaction with more or less the same payoffs to take place multiple times, 
and value the future payoffs, defection is not as obvious since the immediate gain of defecting 
might be less than the gains from future cooperation – which the defecting state most likely 
will be excluded from. Lengthening the shadow of the future thus make the prospect for 
cooperation better.  
3.4.3 The effect of the number of players 
The number of players affect the chances for cooperation in that it becomes substantially 
smaller the more players that are involved. There are three reasons for this, Oye argues. “First 
… as the number of players increase, transactions and information costs rise” (1986, p. 19). It 
becomes very difficult and complex to identify mutual interests, and in turn coordinate and 
adjust policies so they become more coherent. “Second, as the number of players increases, 
the likelihood of autonomous defection and of recognition and control problems increases” 
(Ibid.). It becomes difficult to keep overview, and the chance for including a weak state that is 
unable or unwilling to act as expected increases. “Third, as the number of players increases, 
the feasibility of sanctioning defectors diminishes” (Ibid.). Keeping a strategy of reciprocity 
becomes very difficult, since the cost of a player defecting are felt by every player. In the next 
game everyone would thus defect, and the cooperation would collapse. The threat of 
reciprocal defection thus becomes void, which in turn makes free riding a viable option.  
3.4.4 International Regimes 
In a multilateral setting the main strategy for altering these three dimensions in a way that 
increase the prospects for cooperation is through regime building (Oye, 1986). Oye (Ibid.) 
offers a few unilateral and bilateral strategies as well, but since the BRICS framework is 
multilateral, multilateral strategies are more relevant. Before I describe how regimes alter the 
payoff structure, shadow of the future, and issues created by several players, a basic 
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understanding of what a regime is and how it works is necessary.     
 A widely used definition of a regime is Krasner’s, which holds that it is: 
Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are 
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. 
(1982, p. 186). 
It can be understood as a way of doing things and something that provides “rules of thumb” 
(Keohane, 1984, p. 84) for states maneuvering in certain arenas in the international arena. 
Regimes contain “injunctions about behavior” (Keohane, 1984, p. 59) – some far-reaching 
and very central, others mere “matters of convenience” (Ibid.). They are not only agreements, 
which often are ad hoc in character, but a tool for facilitating agreements. They imply that 
short-term calculations of interests do not dominate the long-term ones and they “embody 
some sense of general obligation” (Krasner, 1982, p. 187).    
 Examples of the first pillar, principles, are the nonproliferation regime’s fundamental 
principle that the spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous and the postwar trade and monetary 
regime’s emphasis on “open, nondiscriminatory patterns of international economic 
transactions” (Keohane, 1984, p. 58). Examples of the second, norms, are the former regime’s 
norm of members not acting in “ways that facilitate nuclear proliferation” (Ibid.), and the 
latter regime’s norm of members practicing “non-discrimination and reciprocity and move 
towards increased liberalization” (Ibid.). Principles and norms may seem to describe more or 
less the same thing, but Keohane argues that “norms contain somewhat clearer injunctions to 
members about legitimate and illegitimate behavior” (Ibid.). Principles and norms are the 
“basic defining characteristic of a regime” (Krasner, 1982, p. 187). To keep the regime intact, 
these two pillars must remain more or less unaltered. If not, it would be a change to a new 
regime or the end of regime-based relations in that specific issue area.    
 Rules and decision-making procedures may however change without a change in the 
regime itself. New rules and procedures can be incorporated under the same principles and 
norms, and a change in these would thus only be a change within the regime (Ibid.).
21
 As with 
norms and principles, the difference between norms, principles and rules can seem a bit 
unclear, but rules are not as abstract as norms and “indicate in more detail the specific rights 
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 A good example of this is the re-alignment of IMF quotas, briefly mentioned before and subject to thorough 
discussion later, where the fundamental principles and guiding norms of the IMF persisted, but both its rules and 
decision-making procedures changed (or will change when the reforms are implemented). 
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and obligations of members” (Keohane, 1984, p. 58). Lastly, decision-making procedures do 
not deal with substance as the other three pillars, but provide regimes with “ways of 
implementing their principles and altering their rules” (Ibid.).     
 The creation of a regime is, as with cooperation itself, fundamentally dependent on 
mutual interests. More specifically: the “existence of patterns of common or complementary 
interests that are perceived or capable of being perceived by political actors” (Keohane, 1984, 
p. 78). If this condition is the case, there is an incentive to create a regime as means of 
increasing the chance of realizing these common interests. Further, the prospects for success 
are increased if rewards and punishment can be used to magnify the levels of shared interests. 
In the absence of a hegemon, this can be provided by having outcomes “determined by a 
relatively small number of actors that can monitor each other’s compliance” (Keohane, 1984, 
p. 79). In addition will the density of the “policy space” matter: because high policy density 
means that ad-hoc agreements are bound to interfere with one another, a regime will be 
preferable over ad-hoc arrangements since every agreement within that policy space will be 
considered within the same set of rules and procedures, thus reducing costs and increasing 
efficiency (Ibid.).           
 A very important point is that regimes operate in an anarchic world among sovereign 
states. Their injunctions do not have any independent enforcement power, but depends on the 
states that are part of the regime adhering to them. Regimes should thus not be seen as a form 
of supranational authority stretching beyond the nation-state, but as Keohane argues, 
“arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of systems in which sovereignty 
remains a constitutive principle” (1984, p. 63). Regimes, however, have the ability to affect 
interests. Interests depend on expectations of the consequences that follow a specific action, 
as well as fundamental values, and Keohane (1984) argues that regimes may shape and 
influence both.          
 Since regimes survive and thrive under the mercy of their egoistic members, 
enforcement is difficult and compliance cannot be taken for granted. Yet, compliance seems 
to be the norm and often takes place “even when governments have incentives, on the basis of 
myopic self-interest, to violate the rules” (Keohane, 1984, p. 98).  Myopic self-interest is 
understood as the alternative that would produce the highest return from a range of alternative 
actions when not taking into account the effect this action has on other issues, i.e. treated 
completely isolated. At the outset this seems to breach premise of egoistic and rational actors’ 
which is central here. Keohane, however, argues that instead of questioning the theories that 
assumes this premise, this rather begs the question of “how interests are defined, and how 
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institutions affect states’ definitions of their own interests” (1984, p. 100). Still assuming 
rational actors, he then proceeds with arguing that regimes can make states define their 
interests in less myopic terms, and thus increase the prospects of compliance, in two ways.
22
 
First the members of a regime realize the difficulty and high cost of establishing a robust 
regime, and thus find it rational to obey the rules and principles in fear that breaching them 
will make the regime collapse. They will be worse off without the regime since high 
transaction costs and limited information would make agreements much more difficult to 
reach, and they can’t count on a new regime rising from the ashes of the old.  
 Second, regimes operate in a context of other regimes and are part of a larger network 
of regimes, issues and agreements. The linkage of issues forces members of a regime to 
forego some of its myopic tendencies, since the potential gains of defecting on one issue, 
assuming the regime in fact covers more than one issue or that the same members are present 
in other issue regimes, will be lost by others doing the same on another issue, or by damaging 
the defector’s reputation, making it less trustworthy and attractive as a partner (Keohane, 
1984).
23
  
3.4.5 How International Regimes facilitate cooperation 
So, how do international regimes provide a payoff structure that work as an incentive for 
cooperation? How does it lengthen the shadow of the future, making it less profitable to 
defect? And how does it reduce the issues posed by many players trying to cooperate? Some 
of the answers are evident in the description of regimes above, but more specifically Oye 
(1986) emphasize the following reasons.       
 Concerning the payoff structure, he argues that a regime changes it in two ways. The 
first way is by regime norms being internalized by the participating states. The standard of 
behavior prescribed by the regime becomes an integrated feature of each state in the regime, 
thus changing the magnitude of difference in the payoff for each country. The second way is 
by a change in states’ understanding of their interest due to the information generated by 
regimes – regimes are information providers, and this information might for example alter 
members’ understanding of “cause-and-effect relationships” (Oye, 1986, p. 11) and 
perceptions of “means-ends hierarchies” (Ibid.). A new perception of reality surely changes 
interests, and thus how different payoffs are valued in issues covered by these interests. 
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 That regimes can affect the interests of those participating in it, resembles the arguments of reflective 
institutionalism, which holds that “institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units 
constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power” (Keohane, 1988, p. 382). 
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 Because of high levels of interdependence in the world political economy, Keohane argues that this 
assumption is correct for basically any government in the world (1984, p. 104).  
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 When it comes to lengthening the shadow of the future by creating more iterations, the 
main path is through the strategy of reciprocity where “… a promise to respond to present 
cooperation with future cooperation and a threat to respond to present defection with future 
defection can improve the prospects for cooperation” (Oye, 1986, p. 15). This insight is based 
on the experiments of Axelrod (1984), who found that among a range of different strategies 
available when confronted with an iterated prisoners’ dilemma, the tit-for-tat strategy did best 
overall when paired with other, and even more complicated, strategies. For strategies of 
reciprocity to be effective, it is crucial that the conditions of play are favorable in the 
following ways. The actors involved need to be able to differentiate clearly between acts of 
cooperation and acts of defection. This is often not the case in international relations. States 
define and interpret actions and statements differently and they don’t necessary act 
transparently. They also need to be in control over the area that covers the specific issue, since 
“… internal factional, organizational and bureaucratic dysfunctions may limit the ability of 
nations to implement Tit-for-Tat strategies” (Oye, 1986, p. 16). It is difficult to respond in 
kind to a specific action if strong interest groups within a state oppose a flexible approach – 
which is necessary for a tit-for-tat strategy – but unpredictable and potentially damaging for 
special interests.           
 It is here regimes offer its services. First through its norms, where an “explicit 
codification” (Oye, 1986, p. 17) of these norms may limit “definitional ambiguity” (Ibid.). In 
such a situation there is no room for autonomous interpretation, and each regime member 
knows exactly what is expected of them and what they can expect in return for their behavior. 
Second through its mechanisms for increasing information and surveillance, which makes it 
easier to evaluate the behavior of other members, and in extension let members make 
informed projections about other members’ future behavior. This reduces uncertainty and 
increases transparency.         
 Lastly a regime offers a remedy to the problem of many players in two ways. First, a 
regime’s conventions provides “rules of thumb that can diminish transaction and information 
costs” (Oye, 1986, p. 20). This resembles the point made above on favorable conditions of 
play. By providing clear and uncomplicated definitions of expected behavior, a regime 
reduces the effort needed to cooperate among many players. Second, a regime’s “collective 
enforcement mechanisms decrease the likelihood of autonomous defection and permit 
selective punishment of violators of norms” (Oye, 1986, p. 20). Better enforcement and 
greater chance of being penalized makes the incentive to defect smaller. Several players also 
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mean a larger punishment, since all players would inflict punishment towards the defecting 
player. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
Adding the insight from past evidence, leading perceptions and the knowledge from 
cooperation theory together with my research question that asks what keeps the BRICS from 
robustly cooperating, suggests three hypotheses worth analyzing.     
 First, if mutual interests are absent, cooperation will never materialize. A potential 
explanation (and indeed the one that is most frequently employed) is therefore that the BRICS 
struggle to cooperate because of a lack of compatible interests. My first hypothesis is 
therefore: 
 H1: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have incompatible interests 
Since this case study is limited to observations on BRICS’ interaction towards reforming IFIs, 
one of the issues where BRICS’ interests are believed to be most compatible, it might seem 
awkward to have a hypothesis that argues that they do not have compatible interests. This 
being said, it is meaningless to discuss any other explanation as to why cooperation did not 
materialize if we don’t find compatible interests. Any thorough analysis of why cooperation 
did not materialize must thus include an assessment of the compatibility of interests. 
 Second, if policy coordination is absent it is by definition not cooperation. We 
therefore need to evaluate if what is described as cooperation by the BRICS themselves; by 
analysts; and by commentators, in fact are cooperation. As Oye argues, “when you observe 
cooperation, think Harmony – the absence of gains from defection – before puzzling over how 
states were able to transcend the temptations of defection” (1986, p. 7). If harmony best 
describes the relationship between the BRICS, the payoff structure in the areas of joint action 
is structured in a way where the five countries do not prefer unilateral defection (DC) to 
unrequited cooperation (CD). I.e. they would not have anything to gain by double-crossing 
the others. In Keohane’s (1984) terminology, a situation of harmony also describes a situation 
where it is not necessary to coordinate and adjust policies in order to realize the specific 
mutual interests at hand. If this is the case, what is described as BRICS cooperation is rather a 
platform for identifying harmonious interests
24
 already present that need no policy 
coordination to be realized in the first place.      
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 Keohane (1984) does not refer to “harmonious interests”, only compatible interests and harmonious policies. 
But in this framework it makes sense to use harmonious as a value on the independent variable interest. 
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 What is most relevant, however, is that if the interaction between the BRICS is limited 
to mostly collective action in areas where policies already align, this suggests that the actual 
gain from BRICS interaction is rather low (their autonomous policies would most likely 
realize the mutual interest anyway), as well as there being clear limitations for their 
interaction (there can only be so many areas of harmony). My second hypothesis is therefore: 
H2: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have harmonious interests 
Third, as we saw above, regime building is argued to be the best strategy to increase the 
prospects for cooperation in multilateral contexts (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986). Its principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures help reduce the issues that states trying to 
cooperate face. Since robust cooperation most likely will be supported by regime features in 
some form, a logical inference is that its absence would make cooperation much harder to 
achieve. My third, and also main, hypothesis is therefore that: 
H3: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have overlapping interests, but weak 
regime features between them 
This final hypothesis is in turn based on several sub hypotheses explaining why no regime has 
(yet) formed: 
H3.1 Their principles do not converge  
H3.2 They have not created shared norms  
H3.3 They have not created shared rules 
H3.4 They have not established decision-making procedures  
Some clarification on how the three hypotheses relate to each other, and if they are mutually 
exclusive or not is necessary. If we don’t find any compatible interests between the BRICS, it 
is meaningless to claim that something other than incompatible interests explain why robust 
cooperation has not materialized. The obvious reason for this is that mutual interests are 
prerequisite for cooperation. The first hypothesis thus rivals the other two.   
 By extension of this, the second hypothesis – as indicated by its wording – is only 
relevant if there is evidence of the first hypothesis being wrong. If we find support for the 
second hypothesis, it is – as above – meaningless to claim that something other than harmony 
explains why robust cooperation has not materialized: if harmony is the case there is no need 
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to coordinate policies, i.e. cooperate, to realize mutual interests.  The second hypothesis thus 
also rivals the other two.         
 So, only in the case of the first and second hypothesis being wrong, is the third 
hypothesis relevant. The first and second hypotheses thus mostly function by analyzing to 
which degree the necessary condition for the last hypothesis, overlapping interests, is in place. 
If the first and second hypothesis is wrong, the third hypothesis should in theory be correct, 
since we have covered the range of possible explanations for why cooperation succeeds or 
fails.
25
            
 These conclusions regarding the relationship between the hypotheses is however only 
true if we were dealing with clear cut answers and no degrees, meaning no degrees of 
incompatible, harmonious and overlapping interests. This is not the case here, so the key is 
rather to evaluate the relative strength of these degrees. 
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 If overlapping interests is the case, the explanation for the lack of robust cooperation must (at least 
theoretically) lie in weak regime features. The reason being that regime building is suggested as the strategy by 
Oye (1986) for increasing the prospects of multilateral cooperation. 
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4. Research Design 
Before I turn to actually analyzing my hypotheses, some attention on how I intend to do it is 
necessary. In the following subchapters I therefore present the key components of my 
research design. I begin with elaborating on my method of choice: the reasons choosing it, 
how I intend to interpret my empirical data, and the thesis’ variables. I continue with 
explaining why I have limited my observations to BRICS interaction towards reforming IFIs, 
as well as the type of data I will analyze. I conclude the chapter with some brief reflections 
regarding validity. 
4.1 Method  
Choosing a method of inquiry depends on the nature of the question and the structure of the 
data. In general the case study is the method of choice when experiments and large n-analysis 
is inadequate or infeasible (Van Evera, 1997, p. 55). This does not mean that the case study is 
inferior to the other two methods. It can for example be superior if we aim to “infer or test 
hypotheses” (Ibid.). In this instance, the question asked focus on a specific group, the BRICS, 
and test hypotheses concerning their interaction. Moreover, my research question also seems 
to fit well with Yin’s definition of the case study: 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. … The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situations in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points,
 
and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as 
another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. (1994, p. 13).
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A case study can, according to Van Evera, serve five main purposes: “testing theories, 
creating theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance of these antecedent 
conditions, and explaining cases of intrinsic importance” (1997, p. 55). Since the main aim of 
this case study is to analyze what it is that keep the BRICS from robustly cooperating, this 
study serves the purpose explaining a case of intrinsic importance. In line with this, the case 
selection criteria has been what Van Evera describes as the criteria of “intrinsic importance” 
(1997, p. 88), which he argues is “appropriate if our object is to explain the course of history” 
(1997, p. 87). The BRICS is mainly important from a policy perspective, since their concerted 
efforts towards issues of global significance may have profound consequences – not only for 
the BRICS countries themselves, but for global governance as well. At the same time it can be 
                                                 
26
 In this thesis, however, there are more data points than variables, although far from enough to talk about 
statistical significance. A small n study seems thus to be a reasonable description of this thesis. 
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argued that this thesis adds to the literature on international regimes – albeit in a limited way.
 The dependent variable in this thesis is policies, since robust cooperation is understood 
as frequent coordination of policies as a means towards realizing mutual interests. Policies 
can in turn be explained by two independent variables. The first is interests, which in this 
framework can be incompatible, harmonious or overlapping. Cooperation is only meaningful 
or possible if interests are overlapping. The second independent variable is regime features. 
This independent variable is only relevant in the case of overlapping interests. If overlapping 
interests is the case, the level of regime features can explain why policies were not 
successfully coordinated and adjusted. Table two shows the relationship between the 
variables: 
Table 2 Relationship between variables 
Dependent variable (DV) 
 
Independent Variables (IV) 
 
Values on IV 
Policies 
Interests 
 
Incompatible 
Harmonious 
Overlapping 
Regime features 
 
Strong or weak, depending on the 
level of converging principles, shared 
norms and rules and established 
decision-making procedures 
 
Explanations of specific events or phenomena, such as the BRICS can take one of three 
forms, based on how specific and generalized they are (Van Evera, 1997, p. 15). Here we 
have what we can describe as a generalized specific explanation. This means that the 
explanation offered is a specific explanations for this case, but that it at the same time 
“identifies the theories that govern its operation” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 16), which in this case 
is the theory of regimes facilitating cooperation.       
 When explaining cases, four questions are critical when assessing the specific 
explanation’s value (Van Evera, 1997, p. 74). First, does the explanation exemplify a valid 
general theory? Second, is the covering law’s causal phenomenon present in the case? Third, 
is the covering law’s antecedent condition(s) met in the case? Fourth, are the covering law’s 
intervening phenomena observed in the case?      
 Since we have three specific hypotheses, we have three potential explanations. 
However, with regards to Van Evera’s (1997) four questions it makes sense to combine the 
three hypotheses with basis in the third hypotheses, since answering the four questions with 
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basis in the third hypothesis’ explanation captures the other two hypotheses as well. The third 
hypothesis’ explanation would 1) exemplify the theory that a regime can facilitate 
cooperation, 2) have weak regime features as the covering law’s causal phenomenon, 3) have 
overlapping interests as its antecedent condition, and 4) have non-converging principles and 
absent shared norms, rules, and decision-making procedures as its intervening variables. By 
analyzing to which degree the explanation’s antecedent condition is met, we by default also 
analyze the first and second hypotheses.       
 We can say right away that this explanation represents a general theory,
27
 so this 
explanation’s fruitfulness will be measured by how the findings compare to the answers given 
to the second, third and fourth question.        
 Van Evera’s (1997) approach resembles the process tracing format, where  “the cause-
effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into 
smaller steps … [before] the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step” (Van 
Evera, 1997, p. 64). If the process tracing fails to provide evidence in line with the answers to 
the questions above, the credibility of the cause and effect relationship is undermined. The 
causal chain for the explanation above is:  
 
H3: Weak regime no converging principles and absent norms, rules and decision-
 making procedures no robust cooperation  
While the following causal logic lies behind the first two hypotheses: 
H1: Incompatible interests  absence of mutual beneficial outcomes  no robust 
cooperation 
H2: Harmony  no policy coordination and no gains of defecting, only collective 
action in areas where policies already align  no robust cooperation 
4.2 Observations and data 
Observations on the case of the BRICS framework are limited to BRIC(S) interaction towards 
reforming IFIs, in the period from the fall of 2008 up until the spring of 2014. Most notably 
the observations include their aim at reforming the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank Group (WBG), in addition to their attempts at creating their own IFI-
structures, such as a BRICS development bank and a financial safety net in the form of a 
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 This means that the theory has not flunked in its general form, i.e. that it has not been established that A does 
not cause B. If this is the case, all specific explanations of A because of B can be ruled out (Van Evera, 1997, p. 
40). 
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Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The data points are specific BRIC(S) interactions in 
relation to these issues, such as summits, meetings, and specific actions, as well as relevant 
individual BRIC(S) behavior, held and executed in the stated time period.   
 The reason for this limitation of observations is due to considerations concerning 
quality and space: if I were to include observations from other areas, I would have to reduce 
the depth and scope of my focus on each area or gone beyond the allocated space. The reason 
for choosing observations on reforming IFIs rests on the following arguments. First, this is the 
area that is most interesting from a policy perspective, since this is the area where the BRICS 
most likely have the greatest potential in representing a bloc in international relations. Second, 
this is the area that provided the initial platform for their interaction, and the area that the 
BRICS have paid most attention towards over the years. Third, out of the many areas on the 
BRICS agenda, this is one of the areas, quite possibly the area, where their interests are most 
compatible. This means that reforming IFIs is the area where we can get the most complete 
picture of what it is that keeps the BRICS from robustly cooperating. Finally, because of all 
this, reforming IFIs is also the area richest in data.       
 Different sources of data are complementary, and efforts should be made to use as 
many sources as possible. However, the issue at hand combined with limits on time and 
resources, severely limits the sources which are available and feasible. This case study has 
therefore been conducted within the boundaries of documentation and archival records as the 
main source of evidence. The data mainly consists of joint statements and communiques from 
meetings between BRIC(S) heads of government and state and finance ministers; statements 
and communiques from the proceedings in the G20, the IMF and in the WBG; documents 
from the BRICS countries’ governments; speeches; newspaper articles, op-eds and expert 
opinion.          
 Problems with relying on documentation and archival records as the source of 
evidence is that the retrievability might be low, the selection might be biased if the collection 
is incomplete, the reporting might be biased if the original author was biased and the access 
may be deliberately blocked or, in the case of archival records, low due to privacy reasons 
(Yin, 1994, p. 80)           
 In this case, the retrievability and access is only partly satisfactory. Some documents 
that would be of significant value, such as minutes from meetings among the BRICS heads of 
government and state and finance ministers, and from deliberations in other multilateral 
forums, such as in the IMF’s Executive Board, are not retrievable because they are not made 
public. Some of the concepts discussed in this thesis, such as principles, norms and rules are 
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rather abstract, and difficult to analyze without specific types of data, such as those mentioned 
above. Although better data would significantly improve this thesis, it is my opinion that I am 
still able to infer plausible conclusions with the documentation I have access to and have been 
able to retrieve.         
 Selection and reporting bias should not be a central issue because the “collection” in 
this instance is more or less complete, and much of the data is authored by the BRICS 
themselves or multilateral institutions. There are nonetheless certain types of information, 
such as documentation of embarrassing conflicts or discord, which most likely is 
systematically held back. What bias might exist I try to mitigate by data triangulation and 
relying on several sources from different institutions with differing agendas, for instance the 
media that optimally functions as a watch dog on governments with their own spin doctors.   
4.3 Validity  
The quality of research designs depend on four tests: construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability.       
 Construct validity refers to “establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied” (Yin, 1994, p. 33). Using multiple sources of evidence, and establishing a 
chain of evidence that is easy to track and deconstruct, are two strategies that is incorporated 
here and believed to create strong construct validity (Yin, 1994). In addition, the concepts and 
measurements I employ being grounded in theory also helps.    
 Internal validity refers to causal relationships and to which degree I can be certain that 
the inferences I make are correct; more specifically that Y is a function of X and not 
something else. For instance, to what degree can I be sure that the absence of cooperation 
among the BRICS is due to the lack of regime features and not because the conditions 
necessary for cooperation to take place have not been met? Van Evera’s (1997) method of 
assessing the quality of an explanation described above is one of the strategies I employ for 
raising internal validity. It also helps that my hypotheses are rivalling, and that I have covered 
the theoretical range of potential explanations for why cooperation succeeds or fails. 
 External validity refers to whether and to where the findings and conclusions can be 
generalized. Can it provide insight for other cases, other periods of time or under a different 
operationalization? Generally the value of research that cannot be generalized is limited. The 
exception is when the case – as I have argued is the situation here – has intrinsic value in and 
of itself. The findings here cannot really be generalized beyond the BRICS framework, 
perhaps not even beyond other issues on the BRICS agenda that deals with global 
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governance.
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 It is nonetheless important to note that case studies do not rely on the traditional 
understanding of generalization, i.e. statistical generalization, where a sample “generalizes to 
a larger universe” (Yin, 1994, p. 36). Rather, case studies rely on analytical generalization, 
where the “investigator … [strives] to generalize a particular set of results to some broader 
theory” (Ibid.). Albeit not the main priority, the results here thus may be generalized to the 
broader cooperation theory, and the theory of the functions of regimes.  
 Reliability, also known as reproducibility, refers to the potential of the same study to 
be conducted again in the exact same fashion and to which extent this study gives the same 
findings and conclusions. If reliability is high, the errors and biases in a study tend to be low. 
Reliability can be increased by making as many steps as possible operational and to document 
the research procedures. Yin (1994) argues that documentation can be increased by using a 
case study protocol and case study database. A case study database generally consists of two 
collections; the report and a data or evidence base. In this case the former is this master’s 
thesis and the latter is the list of references and the in-text references to specific pages. A case 
study protocol “is intended to guide the investigator in carrying out the case study” (Yin, 
1994, p. 63). Here this chapter functions as the protocol, since it contains sufficient guidance 
and information for someone else to conduct the same study. 
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 Even though issues that deal with global governance make up most of the BRICS agenda, the framework, as 
was evident in the brief overview of the BRIC(S) trajectory in the introductory chapter, also includes issues that 
are best categorized as intra-BRICS issues. These are issues that have limited relevance in a global setting. Good 
examples are exchanges and information sharing in issues such as culture, health and statistics.  
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 5. Reforming International Financial Institutions 
In the following subchapters I discuss the lack of robust BRICS cooperation by looking at 
their interaction towards reforming IFIs. A rather broad understanding of “reforming IFIs” is 
employed, and it is my own assessment that have decided which issues on the BRIC(S) 
agenda that can be grouped under the larger umbrella of reforming IFIs. This assessment led 
to four main issues being identified: increasing emerging and developing economies’ 
influence in IFIs; ending the West’s stranglehold on IFI leader positions; increasing the utility 
of IFIs; and establishing new IFI structures, in the form of a BRICS development bank and a 
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).       
 The following analysis is structured around these four issues, and organized into four 
subchapters, one for each main issue. Each subchapter is further structured in the following 
way: first each issue is presented, by emphasizing the way the BRIC(S) have jointly presented 
them as well as how interaction towards these issues later evolved. I then analyze the 
BRIC(S) countries interests in these issues, and evaluate if they are incompatible, harmonious 
or overlapping. In the case of overlapping interests, I then discuss regime features. 
 Before I move onto my analysis, two brief introductions are useful. The first concerns 
IFI’s governance structure and role. Much of the coming discussion will be based on 
BRIC(S)’ interaction towards these institutions and some basic knowledge of how they 
function and are structured is necessary to fully understand the following analysis.  
 First of all, the already established IFIs that are central in the analysis are the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG). In their statements, 
the BRIC(S) seem to use “World Bank” (WB) and “World Bank Group” somewhat arbitrary. 
This might be confusing, but it is mainly the WB, comprised of two of the five organizations 
in the WBG, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its 
concessional loan associate the International Development Agency (IDA), that is important.
29
 
 The IMF provides policy advice on financial and economic issues and financial aid to 
member countries in need (IMF, n.d.a). The WB contributes with loans and technical 
assistance to emerging and developing countries (WBG, n.d.b), often towards key 
development projects, such as infrastructure. Together, the WB and the IMF is often referred 
to as the Bretton Woods Institutions.       
 Both the IMF and the WBG have what is called a weighted voting system, meaning 
that the power structure is decided by how much each member contributes to the institution. 
The size of the contribution is in turn based on each member’s relative economic position in 
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 See footnote 7 for more information about the composition of the WBG. 
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the world. In general, this means that large economies have more power than smaller 
economies.           
 Emerging and developing states have generally had an ambivalent relationship 
towards the IMF and the WB – to say the least. After all the debt stemming from the Latin 
American debt crisis in the 1980s and from the Asian and Russian financial crises in the late 
1990s were paid back by the beginning of the 2000s, middle income states have tended to 
avoid IMF aid for all costs (Fourcade, 2013). They have rather turned to bilateral 
arrangements or their own reserves, even though this often has meant short term hardship 
(Ibid.). The reluctance to borrow from the WB also grew larger after the turn of the century, 
albeit not reaching the same levels as it did with regards to the IMF (Babb, 2013). And as I 
will return to later, all the BRICS are current borrowers at the WB.    
 For some time, up until the financial crisis broke, the resistance towards the IFIs had 
severe consequences for the two institutions, especially for the IMF, which had to cut down 
on expenses and perks (Fourcade, 2013). Soon, however, at least the IMF became highly 
relevant, as traditional creditors, such as the European countries that were hit the hardest in 
the financial crisis, became new borrowers, and as the road to global recovery was mapped 
out. This relevance is still the case.        
 The second introduction concerns the current state of BRICS institutionalism, which is 
useful since it helps understand BRICS interaction, and its general decision-making 
procedures. The closest the BRICS have come in institutionalizing their interaction is their 
meetings that have taken place on semi-regular intervals since the first standalone meeting 
between BRIC foreign ministers in May 2008. These meetings range from summits between 
heads of government and state to workshops between track II representatives. Summits 
between BRIC(S) leaders have been arranged every year since 2009, beginning in 
Yekaterinburg, and then in Brasilia, Sanya (South Africa’s first summit), New Delhi, and 
Durban. The summit in Fortaleza in July 2014 will be the first summit in the second cycle of 
summits, and BRICS leaders have decided that they will follow the future host cycle of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS 2013, n.d.a).   
 The summits usually lasts one day and offers an opportunity for the heads of state and 
government to discuss various issues of global importance,
30
 identify new areas and issues 
they can cooperate in, as well as make decisions on proposals and suggestions prepared 
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 As indicated in the introduction, these issues range from comments on topical issues, for instance the civil war 
in Syria and the earthquake in Japan, to more persistent challenges in the world, such as food and energy security 
and climate change. They also discuss and lay out various areas that the BRICS potentially can cooperate in, and 
draw upon one another’s experiences.   
 37 
 
beforehand by lower ranking BRICS officials.      
 In addition to these summits, BRIC(S) leaders have also had more informal standalone 
meetings when they have been participants in other forums. Chronologically, they met on the 
sidelines of the G8 Summit in Hokkaido in July 2008, of the G20 Summit in Cannes in 
November 2011, of the G20 Summit in Los Cabos in June 2012 and of the G20 Summit in St. 
Petersburg in September 2013 (Reis, 2013; BRICS Information Centre, n.d.). 
 Moving down the ladder, BRICS finance ministers, often accompanied by their central 
bank governors, see each other on a regular interval and several times a year on the margins 
of G20 ministerial meetings,
31
 and of the Spring and Annual Meetings in the IMF/WBG. Two 
of the annual G20 ministerial meetings take place in conjunction with the Spring and Annual 
Meetings, but in total there are at least 5-7 meetings that BRICS finance ministers participates 
in every year. In the time around these meetings they often have standalone meetings as well.  
Such meetings have been arranged in São Paulo in November 2008; in Horsham (March), 
London (early September) and Pittsburgh (late September) in 2009; in Paris (February) and 
Washington (September) in 2011; in Washington D.C. (April) and Tokyo (October) in 2012; 
In Moscow (July) and Washington D.C. (October) in 2013; and in Washington D.C. (April) 
thus far in 2014 (Reis, 2013; BRICS 2013, n.d.a; The Brics Post, 2013a; The Brics Post, 
2013b; The Brics Post, 2014).        
 In order to prepare these meetings, as well as the BRICS summits, there are also 
regular meetings between BRICS sherpas and sous-sherpas.
32
 There is also contact between 
BRICS financial and fiscal authorities beyond the offices of their finance ministers. 
Concerning the development bank for instance, meetings have been arranged between BRICS 
experts on this issue (BRICS 2013, n.d.b). Since 2010, there have also been close contact 
between the countries’ national development banks (BNDES, 2010).   
 With these two introductions in place, I move on the analysis.     
5.1 Increasing emerging and developing economies’ influence in IFIs 
Before I continue it is useful to note that BRIC(S)’ arguments concerning more power in IFIs 
are perfectly legitimate from an objective point of view. Since the power structure in the IMF 
is based on a formula that accounts for each member’s relative economic position in the 
world, the allocation of power also need to be changed from time to time, due to relative 
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 A G20 ministerial refers to a meeting between finance ministers and central bank governors. A G20 summit 
refers to meetings between state leaders. 
32
 Sherpas and sous-sherpas are government officials that have a preparatory role before higher level officials 
such as ministers and state leaders meet. Sous-sherpas rank lower than sherpas. 
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positional change because of variations in growth. The vested interests of those who currently 
have larger voting shares than their economic weight would suggest they should have, and a 
sluggish and bureaucratic approach to transformation, has however led to a gap between the 
relative economic position and actual power position in the IMF for many member states. 
Regarding the BRICS, a comparison made by the Economist in 2011 showed that they are the 
most underrepresented group of countries in the IMF. Even though they at the time made up 
around 21 % of world GDP, they only had (and still have) 11 % of the total votes in the IMF.  
The EU on the other hand accounted for just under 24 % of world GDP, but held (and still 
holds) 32 % of IMF votes (The Economist, 2011).      
 In the WBG, the system is in general similar to the IMF system. In the WB, the 
amount of voting power is based on the amount of shares held by each country in the 
institution. Shares are in turn purchased based on members’ relative economic strength – 
although based on a different formula than the one the IMF uses (The World Bank, 2011).
 Most of BRIC(S) interaction aimed at increasing their and other emerging and 
developing economies’ influence in IFIs have been limited to two actions. The first is joint 
statements and rhetoric, and the second is voting accordingly when decisions concerning 
governance structure have been put to the table in the IFIs. Concerning the former, it is 
particularly the meetings and summits between BRIC(S) finance ministers and central bank 
governors and heads of government and state mentioned above, that have been used to 
identify and convey shared ambitions of increased influence. Upon conclusion of these 
meetings, the BRIC(S) have made their views known and heard, and built momentum vis-à-
vis the developed world.         
 The first joint message of this kind was given at the first meeting between BRIC 
finance ministers and central bank governors, on the eve of the G20 ministerial in São Paulo 
on November 7 2008. In the joint communique they released upon conclusion of the meeting 
they said that:  
We called for reform of multilateral institutions in order that they reflect the structural changes 
in the world economy and increasingly central role that emerging markets now play …Reform 
of the International Monetary Fund and of the World Bank Group should move forward and be 
guided towards more equitable voice and participation between advanced and developing 
countries. The Financial Stability Forum
33
  must immediately broaden its membership to include 
a significant representation of emerging economies (BRICS 2013, n.d.b).  
                                                 
33
 The Financial Stability Forum (FSB) was established in 1999 by G7 (the G8 countries minus Russia) finance 
ministers and central bank governors, with the mandate of assessing, monitoring and advising on financial issues 
critical to maintaining financial stability in the world (FSB, n.d.). 
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Perhaps encouraged by the recognition this argument got from the G20 finance ministers and 
central bank governors the next day (Ministério de Fazenda, 2008), the BRIC continued with 
their rhetoric. Some months after São Paulo, in March 2009 on the eve of the next G20 
ministerial, in Horsham, England, the BRIC finance ministers said that:  
We call for urgent action with regard to voice and representation in the IMF, in order that they 
better reflect their real economic weights. In the Fund, a significant realignment of quota
34
 
should be completed not later than January 2011. This is necessary to enable members more 
equitable and fuller participation in the Fund's efforts to play its mandate role. A rebalancing of 
representation on the Executive Board
35
 … would lead to a more equitable representation of the 
membership. (BRICS 2013, n.d.d). 
With regards to the WGB they said that: 
We also ask for the speeding up of the second phase of voice and representation reform in the 
World Bank Group, which should be completed by April 2010. This process should ensure they 
fully reflect changes in the world economy and in this respect developing countries and 
emerging economies should have greater voice and representation. This process should be also 
aimed at equitable representation between advanced and emerging/developing countries without 
dilution of any individual developing members. (BRICS 2013, n.d.d), 
 Although somewhat outside the umbrella of IFIs, the finance ministers also made the 
argument in Horsham that the G20, which had evolved from being only a forum for finance 
ministers and central bank governors to a forum for state leaders when George W. Bush 
hosted the first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008, should become the main 
vehicle to deal with the economic issues and the financial crisis that now was ravaging the 
global economy.          
 When BRIC state leaders met for their first summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, 
they adopted their finance ministers’ and central bank governors’ position and reiterated the 
fundamental argument: 
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 A realignment of quotas means a change in voting power, but it also means a change in the contributions to the 
IMF and a change in how much each member can borrow. The allocation of quotas is based on the previously 
mentioned formula that measures a member’s relative economic position in the world. Quotas are subject to 
reviews at regular intervals. Changes, however, need an 85% approval rate and a member’s quota cannot be 
changed without the consent of the specific member (IMF, 2014a). The U.S. holds 16.75% of the quotas (IMF, 
2014b) which in effect give them a veto power in major decisions. Quotas are denominated in Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs), which is the unit of account of the IMF (see footnote 46 for more information about SDRs). 
35
 The IMF’s Executive Board is composed of 24 Directors and the IMF’s Managing Director, which serves as 
the Chairman of the Board. The IMF’s Article of Agreement states that five of the directors shall be elected by 
the five countries with the largest quotas (currently the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, U.K.) while fifteen are 
elected by the other members (IMF, 2014c). Today there are thus four more directors than in the beginning. 
China, Saudi Arabia and Russia have a large enough quota to elect their own representative. The remaining 
members are pooled in 16 different flexible groups where they have one director representing them (IMF, 
2014b).   
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We are committed to advance the reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect 
changes in the global economy. The emerging and developing economies must have greater 
voice and representation in international financial institutions. (Presidential Press and 
Information Office, 2009). 
These statements, and presumably a considerable effort at the G20 meetings, gave concrete 
results at the G20 Pittsburgh summit in September 2009. At the summit, world leaders 
committed to a change in power in form of a “shift in … quota share to dynamic emerging 
markets and developing countries of at least 5% from over-represented countries to under-
represented countries” (G20 Research Group, n.d.a) in the IMF. Concerning the WBG, they 
agreed to change to a “dynamic formula … that generates an increase of at least 3 % of voting 
power for developing and transition countries, to the benefit of under-represented countries” 
(Ibid.) in the IBRD. Moreover, it was decided that the G20 rather than the more exclusive G8 
should be the main platform to discuss global economic issues and the financial crisis. The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB),
36
 comprised of all G20 countries, previous Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) members, Spain and the European Commission, had also been 
established as successor to the FSF prior to the Pittsburgh summit, in April 2009 (G20 
Research Group, n.d.c).         
 After the Pittsburgh summit, BRICs turned their rhetoric towards getting the promise 
of increased influence from fellow world leaders to actual influence within IFIs. At the 
Brasilia summit on April 15 2010 the BRIC leaders was as clear as ever:  
The IMF and the World Bank urgently need to address their legitimacy deficits. Reforming 
these institutions’ governance structures requires first and foremost a substantial shift in voting 
power in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their 
participation in decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy … the 
international community must deliver a result worthy of the expectations we all share for these 
institutions within the agreed timeframe
37
 or run the risk of seeing them fade into obsolescence. 
(Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010). 
Their joint rhetoric was soon awarded. In April 2010 the voting power of “Developing and 
Transition Countries” (DTCs) in the IBRD was increased with 3.13 %.  It was also increased 
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 Beyond increasing the membership, the FSB was given a new broader mandate to “promote financial 
stability”, and in many ways now complements parts of the advisory and supervising role of the IMF (G20 
Research group, n.d.d). Its secretariat is based in Basel, Switzerland. 
37
 The timeframe referred to was decided at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh and at the G20 ministerial in St. 
Andrews, Scotland, in November 2009. In Pittsburgh they agreed that the IMF quota reform should be 
completed by January 2011 and that the WB reform should be completed by the first half of 2010 (G20 Research 
Group, n.d.a). Then, in St. Andrews, it was decided that the Spring Meetings in the IMF and WBG in 2010 was 
to be the deadline for the WB reform (G20 Research Group, n.d.e). 
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with 6.07 % at the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
38
 (WBG, 2010a). The change in 
the IBRD meant that DTCs now had a total of 47.19 % of the voting power. Out of the BRIC, 
China was not surprisingly the biggest winner, since realignments is based on changes in the 
global economy. South Africa, which was still not part of the grouping actually lost power in 
the IBRD, since the shift also was from over-represented to under-represented countries, and 
not only from developed to emerging and developing countries.
39
     
 Then, in December 2010, the IMF quota reform was approved by the IMF’s Board of 
Governors.
40
 The reform shifts approximately 6 % of quotas – more than the minimum target 
set in Pittsburgh – from developed countries to emerging and developing countries and from 
over-represented to under-represented countries (IMF, 2010). This shift makes China the 3
rd
 
largest member in the IMF, while it also establishes Brazil, Russia and India in the top ten 
(IMF (2014a).
41
 Again, South Africa, still not part of the grouping, lost some power. Together 
with the quota reform, the Board of Governors also approved a change in the rules deciding 
the structure and composition of the Executive Board in order to make it more representative. 
Most notably the rebalancing means that “advanced European countries” (Ibid.) will reduce 
their board representation by two seats, and that these seats will be given to developing and 
emerging states.           
 BRIC’s claim for influence in IFIs was thus in many ways recognized. It is, however, 
important to note that the governance reforms in the IMF and WBG was an issue long before 
BRIC foreign ministers had their first meeting in 2008. The need to reallocate quotas and 
voice so it better reflect the current state of the world economy was for instance a central 
point in the IMF’s medium-term strategy presented by the then managing director of the 
Fund, Rodrigo de Rato, at the Annual Meetings in the fall of 2005 (IMF, 2006a). A smaller 
realignment of voting power had also been approved in both the IMF and in the IBRD in 
2008. Finally, the shift in the IMF was lower than what the BRIC had asked for. In his press 
                                                 
38
 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is one of the five organizations in the WBG. It deals exclusively 
with the private sector, and contributes with investment financing and mobilizing capital in international 
financial markets (WBG, n.d.c). The increase of DTCs voting power meant that they now held 39.48% of the 
total voting power in the IFC (WBG, 2010a). 
39
 In the IBRD China increased its voting power from 2.77% to 4.42%, Brazil from 2.06% to 2.24%, and India 
from 2.77 to 2.91%. Russia’s voting power was unchanged and remained at 2.77%. South Africa had their voting 
power reduced from 0.84% to 0.76% (WBG, 2010b). In the IFC, China increased their voting power from 1.02% 
to 2.29%, Brazil from 1.65% to 2.27%, India from 3.38% to 3.81% and Russia from 3.38% to 3.81%. South 
Africa’s voting power remained unchanged at 0.67% (WBG, 2010c)    
40
 The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body of the IMF. It consists of one governor and one 
alternate governor for each of the 188 member countries. The governor is appointed by the member country and 
is usually the minister of finance or the head of the central bank (IMF, 2014d) 
41
 China will increase its voting power from 3.81% to 6.07%, Brazil from 1.72 to 2.22%, India from 2.34% to 
2.63% and Russia from 2.39 to 2.59%. South Africa’s voting power will be decreased from 0.77% to 0.63% 
(IMF, 2014b; IMF, n.d.b). 
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conference after the Pittsburgh summit, India’s Prime Minister Singh said that the BRIC 
wanted a 7 % change, which they believed would push the total voting power of developing 
countries to around 50 %, but that they had agreed to a “compromise figure” (Ministry of 
External Affairs Government of India, 2009). It was nonetheless more than what Europe 
wanted, which did not want to set a target at all (Green, 2009). As it seems now, “Emerging 
Market and Developing Countries” will end up with 44.7% of the total voting power in the 
IMF when the reform is implemented (IMF, 2010).      
 All this being said it is obvious that the BRIC should get a lot of the credit for the 
reforms that ultimately were approved in the IMF and in the WBG in 2010, especially 
regarding the IMF reforms. They were the group that pushed the hardest for it, and had it not 
been for their effort chances are that it would have dragged out, or that the size of the reform 
would have been smaller, or both.        
 While the WBG reforms were implemented in reasonable time (Vestergaard and Vade, 
2014) the IMF reforms was – and still is pending – subject to acceptance by the governments 
of three-fifths of the IMF’s members having a minimum of 85 % voting power (IMF, 2014e). 
The 2010 reforms have therefore continued to be central on the BRIC agenda, also after BRIC 
became BRICS in 2011, and most summits and meetings between the heads of state and 
government, as well as finance ministers, has been used to reiterate an urgency concerning the 
implementation of the agreed upon reform.        
 In 2012, an opportunity to push through the reforms, and thus move beyond rhetoric 
and accepting the necessary amendments as the only means to get the reforms implemented, 
presented itself to the BRICS. It all began in January when IMF director Christine Lagarde 
called on the international community to make 2012 the “year of healing” (IMF, 2012a), and 
to this end asked the governments of the world for $500 billion so the IMF could do its part in 
securing recovery from the financial crisis. She acknowledged Europe’s role as the epicenter 
of the crisis, but called on the rest of the world to do its part as well. When BRICS leaders 
convened in New Delhi two months later, they recognized Lagarde’s fundraising effort, but 
stressed that: 
The ongoing effort to increase the lending capacity of the IMF will only be successful if there is 
confidence that the entire membership of the institution is truly committed to implement the 
2010 Reform faithfully. We will work with the international community to ensure that sufficient 
resources can be mobilized to the IMF in a timely manner as the Fund continues its transition to 
improve governance and legitimacy. (BRICS 2013, n.d.b). 
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In essence they threatened to not contribute towards the joint effort without some sort of 
assurance that the reforms from 2010 would be implemented.    
 Soon after they had done this, it became obvious that they had not really discussed or 
agreed what this meant or implied. The manifestations of this became clear as Russia’s 
Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak disclosed on April 20 2012 that Russia would 
contribute with $10 billon to the IMF. This was before G20 finance ministers, who were 
meeting in Washington D.C. the same day, had stated their intentions about the 2010 IMF 
reforms, i.e. given the assurance that the BRICS had demanded when they met in New Delhi. 
The move from Russia’s Deputy supposedly infuriated Brazilian and Indian diplomats 
(Wood, 2012). Despite Storchak’s comments, the communique from the G20 finance 
ministers said that “we reaffirmed our commitment to fully implement the 2010 Governance 
and Quota Reform by the 2012 IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting” (G20 Research Group, 
n.d.f). This can be read as assurance, but it was also just a reiteration of the same commitment 
towards implementation made at almost every G20 ministerial and summit since the reforms 
were approved in December 2010.
42
 Assuming that the BRICS had more in mind than the 
same old commitments from the G20, and that they potentially could have received a bit more 
from their quid pro quo attempt had it not been for Storchak’s move, the BRICS attempt at 
swapping funds for assurance cannot really be said to be a victory.    
 When BRICS leaders met again at the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, Brazil, 
India, China and South Africa revealed that they, as Russia, also would contribute. The four 
countries contributed with $10 billion, $10 billion, $42 billion and 2 billion, respectively 
(IMF, 2012b). When they released the news of their contribution, they, including Russia, said 
that “these new contributions are being made in anticipation that all the reforms agreed upon 
in 2010 will be fully implemented in a timely manner, including a comprehensive reform of 
voting power and reform of quota shares” (RT, 2012) and that these funds should only be 
used as a “second line of defense” (Ibid.).       
 BRIC(S) joint statements, occasional solicitations and quid pro quo attempts aside; by 
the time of writing the 2010 IMF quota and Executive Board reforms have still not been 
implemented (IMF, 2014d). All five BRICS countries have accepted both the change in 
quotas and the rebalancing and restructuring of the Executive Board (IMF, 2014e), but they, 
as well as the many other countries that have accepted the reforms, still depends on 
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 More or less the exact same phrase was included in the communiques from the G20 ministerials in 
Washington D.C. in April 2011, in Paris in October 2011, in Mexico City in February 2011, and from the G20 
summit in Cannes in November 2011 (G20 Research Group, n.d.g; G20 Research Group, n.d.h; G20 Research 
Group, n.d.i; G20 Research Group, n.d.j). 
 44 
 
congressional approval in the U.S. for its implementation. When the issue was up for 
discussion in January 2014, Congress – despite the Treasury’s and the Obama 
administration’s considerable effort – failed to approve the necessary legislation (Reuters, 
2014).            
 The BRICS have nonetheless, since September 2011, when BRICS finance ministers 
had a meeting in Washington D.C., called for the planned review of the quota formula and the 
next round of quota review, to be initiated (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 
2011). The new quota formula was supposed to be ready by January 2013, while the next 
quota review was supposed to be done by January 2014. Both have been postponed to January 
2015, and as long as the 2010 reforms are not implemented, chances are that it will take even 
longer time (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014). 
5.1.1 Explaining the call for more influence 
Ultimately the BRIC(S) must be said to have experienced some success in their interaction 
towards getting more influence in IFIs. The WBG reforms have been implemented, and they 
are only a congressional approval in the U.S. away from increased influence in the IMF. 
However, this should not be understood as the BRIC(S) successfully adjusting and 
coordinating their policies. As I will return to in a bit, except the attempt at swapping funds 
for implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms in 2012, BRICS interests towards the issue of 
more influence seem to be more or less in a state of harmony.    
 Before I support my argument of harmony, it is useful to establish the underlying 
reasons for the call on more influence in IFIs. On a fundamental level this resonates well with 
leading perceptions of national interests, especially with Morgenthau’s widely established 
premise of states being power maximizers (Morgenthau, 2006). The IMF and WBG continue 
to be key institutions in global economic governance, and should thus be a natural arena for 
the BRICS to want more influence in from a power seeking perspective. By elevating their 
influence in the IFIs they elevate their general power in the world.    
 An issue that needs to be addressed in this regard is the fact that South Africa did not 
elevate their power through the voting reforms in the IMF and in the WBG. Still, this should 
not be misunderstood as the BRICS having incompatible interests, when this interest is 
understood as getting more influence in IFIs. It is, however, an argument for the 
incompatibility of South Africa’s narrow interest concerning changes in voting power under 
the current formulas. Because of this, we should not have expected them to accept the 
reforms; its government to approve the necessary amendment to implement the changes in the 
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IMF quotas; or to join in on the familiar BRIC call of implementation, something which they 
all have done.           
 There are, however, a few reasons as to why they might find it in their interests to do 
so. First of all, through the reforms the power gain for emerging and developing countries is 
much larger than the power loss for South Africa. Even though it is likely that they would 
have preferred not losing power, the argument can be made that they accept this in return for 
weakened western influence. A good example in this regard, is that significant decisions in 
both the IMF and the WBG need an 85% approval rate, and the way it stands now, the U.S., 
because they hold just over 15% of the total vote in both institutions, in effect decides every 
major decision. As long as economic power decides voting power, it will take some time until 
the U.S. drops below the 15 % mark – in fact, the U.S. is actually among those countries that 
are underrepresented in the institutions (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014) – but China will catch 
up, and countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia and others will decrease the gap, meaning 
that the U.S. will lose its veto power eventually. This is in the interest of South Africa, as 
well.           
 Moreover, trying to hold onto their influence and oppose reforms that are very 
legitimate and widely supported, especially among close associates to South Africa, would 
send mixed signals and probably hurt their relationship with these countries. Further, South 
Africa has been a staunch supporter of the larger process of IFI reform, where they have 
expressed a general wish to change a governance model their Finance Minister, Pravin 
Gordhan, has described as a “relic of the post-World War II world” (Gordhan, 2011). Even 
though South Africa does not gain power when the reforms are implemented, the reforms 
make the IFIs more relevant and less of a relic from a different world.   
 Another likely reason as to why it is in South Africa’s interest to accept and join in on 
the arguments for implementation and further quota reform is because it might damage their 
relationship with the BRIC if they stood idle. However, as I will return to in a bit, South 
Africa also accepted the small power adjustments that took place in 2008, which reduced their 
voting power as well. This was three years before their interaction with the BRIC began. So 
even though pleasing the other four countries can be considered as a reason for accepting the 
reforms, it was probably not the most important reason.     
 Concerning a rebalancing of the IMF’s Executive Board, the same arguments of search 
for power applies. The rebalancing increases the power of emerging and developing countries 
in the IMF, since they gain two seats while Europe loses two seats. As it stands now, out of 
the BRICS, Russia and China have their own executive directors, while Brazil, India and 
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South Africa share their representative with other countries. The Executive Board has been a 
particular area of interest for South Africa, and most of their attention towards IMF reform 
have been focused on increasing the participation of Sub-Saharan Africa at the Board, by 
securing a third seat for the region (Gordhan, 2011; Patel, 2011). The rebalancing and 
restructuring agreed to in 2010 does not reserve another seat for Sub-Saharan Africa, but 
South Africa has nonetheless accepted the changes while continuing pushing for a third Sub-
Saharan African director.           
 The search for power also accounts for the final “theme” discussed above, that of 
changing the current IMF quota formula. As mentioned, the quota formula accounts for the 
relative economic position of IMF members, but the way it is structured, Western countries, 
especially EU members, benefits more than others. This is because “openness”, understood as 
the level of integration into the world economy, is a key variable that counts 30% when 
calculating a state’s quota. In this variable, trade between EU members counts while trade 
between regions in China or states in the U.S. does not. Therefore, Belgium and Netherlands 
for instance, which have relatively small economies, have a relative large quota, since their 
economies are so integrated with the rest of the EU (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014). In 
essence, large countries lose out to smaller ones. In the process of establishing a new quota, 
the BRICS are therefore strong proponents of a formula that in a larger degree emphasize 
GDP (counts 50% today), and that includes a variable that accounts for contribution to world 
growth (Ibid.). 
5.1.2 Harmonious rather than overlapping interests 
Oye’s argument of “when you observe cooperation, think harmony” (1986) is very relevant in 
the issue of reallocating IFI influence. The reason for this is that there are no clear evidence 
that policies towards this end first were conflicting, but then adjusted, when BRIC, and later 
BRICS, interaction began. The most central evidence in this regard is the already mentioned 
issue of similar reforms taking place in both the IMF and in the IBRD in 2008, before BRICS 
interaction really got going.          
 In the IMF, an adjustment in quotas was endorsed by the Executive Board and Board 
of Governors in the spring of 2008, before the first standalone meeting between BRIC foreign 
ministers in Yekaterinburg in May 2008 (IMF, 2008a; IMF, 2008b). In the adjustment, China 
increased its voting power from 2.9% to 3.8%, Brazil from 1.4 to 1.7%, and India from 1.9% 
to 2.3%. Russia actually decreased its voting power from 2.7% to 2.4%. South Africa did the 
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same, from 0.9% to 0.8% (IMF, n.d.b).
 43
 By 2010 all five countries had approved the change 
in their quota (IMF, 2014f), and the change was implemented in 2011 (IMF, 2011). 
 In the IBRD, the reforms from 2010 build on reforms endorsed by the WBG’s 
Development Committee
44
 in the fall of 2008. The 2008 reforms increased the voting power 
of developing countries with 1.46%. It was mainly the poorest countries that benefitted from 
the reforms, and none of the BRICS increased their influence. In fact, all five countries lost 
0.01% of their voting power (WBG, 2010b). I have not been able to identify an overview of 
the governments ultimately accepting the reform, but it has been implemented, meaning that 
members representing at least 85% of the total voting power have accepted it. In all likelihood 
this included the BRICS, since the reform was approved by the WBG’s Board of Governors45 
with 98.40% approval rate (Development Committee, 2009). This means that, theoretically, 
only South Africa could have opposed it, since the other four countries each had more than 
1.60% of total voting power at the time. South Africa opposing it is however extremely 
unlikely, especially considering that the reform also gave another seat to Sub-Saharan Africa 
on the WBG’s Board of Directors46.        
 These two examples indicate that both BRICS representatives in the IMF and the 
WBG and BRICS governments acted coherently also before BRIC, and later BRICS, 
ministers and leaders began meeting each other and releasing joint statements advocating 
reform. The examples also lends credence to the argument that BRICS interest in reforming 
the power structure in the IFIs is not limited to only increasing their own voting power – 
South Africa haven’t experienced this in any of the reforms discussed – but increasing the 
general level of power of emerging and developing countries vis-à-vis the Western world. 
 The potential gains of defecting further support the argument of harmony. In essence 
there are none to be had. The consequences of one of the BRIC(S) defecting on the rhetoric, 
or perhaps more relevant, defecting by not accepting the reforms, ranges from nothing to the 
group losing some amount of its clout and external impression of unity and an increased 
chance of continued status quo. The latter would play into the hands of Western powers, 
which – even though all of them but the U.S in case of the 2010 IMF reform has accepted the 
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 Much of the same line of argument of the legitimacy of the reforms and the interest in reducing the West’s 
influence used to explain why South Africa accepted the 2010 reforms, is relevant as explanation as to why both 
South Africa and Russia accepted the 2008 reforms. 
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 The Development Committee is a ministerial-level forum in the WBG and the IMF. It has 25 members, who 
are elected in the same way as members to the Executive Board (see footnote 34). Its main mandate is to advice 
the Board of Governors of the IMF and the WBG on critical development issues (The World Bank, n.d.) 
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 This is the equivalent to the IMF’s Board of Governors (see footnote 40). 
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 The WBG’s Board of Directors is the equivalent to the IMF’s Executive Board, and is structured the same way 
(see footnote 35). 
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reforms – (IMF, 2014e) probably don’t mind keeping things as is, as long as they can put the 
blame for failure to implement the reforms on someone else. The fact that the reforms have 
been more or less widely accepted also by those that potentially could have offered side 
payments to induce defection also indicates that such gains never really existed. It is only the 
U.S., in the case of the 2010 IMF reforms, that potentially would have wanted to induce 
defection. However, since Obama and the treasury want the reforms to be implemented, and 
since Congress (which we can assume emphasize issues such as the legitimacy of the reforms 
less than the U.S. Executive does) can veto it anyway, it is unlikely that any side payments 
ever were on the table.         
 Finally, both the WBG and the IMF represent quite established regimes, so we can 
assume that the payoff structure offers even fewer gains of defecting than what can be 
identified by looking at the issues isolated, since breaking regime principles and norms would 
have consequences beyond the issue at hand. Even though the scope of governance reform is 
subject to disagreement in the IFI membership, a shared principle of the need for reform in 
general, seems to be the case. The origins of such a shared principle can be traced back to the 
beginning of the 2000s, and especially since the Annual Meeting in the IMF and the WBG in 
Singapore in 2006 (IMF, 2006b). Obviously, this does not only apply to the BRICS, but to 
more or less the complete IFI membership. 
5.1.2.1 The notable exception 
The notable exception to harmony in the issue of BRIC(S) interaction towards increasing 
emerging and developing economies’ influence in IFIs is their attempt at using Lagarde’s 
fundraising effort in the spring of 2012 as a means to push through implementation of the 
2010 IMF reforms. First of all, it is nothing that suggests that the failure of this attempt was 
because of incompatible interests. As we saw above, Russia increases its voting power when 
the reforms are implemented. Moreover, Russia is perhaps one of the countries that have been 
most vocal in getting the reforms implemented. A great illustration of this is the Russian 
Finance Minister Anton Siluanov’s supposed suggestion to implement the reforms without the 
U.S.  (Yukhananov and Kelly, 2014).       
 Moreover, BRICS’ attempt demanded policy coordination, since if they were to stick 
with what they said; they unilaterally could not contribute to Lagarde’s fundraising before 
there was a common understanding of assurance that the reforms would be implemented. We 
can also make the case that there are gains of defecting. The situation does not resemble a 
prisoners’ dilemma, since it is reasonable to assume that there is no gain better than having 
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the 2010 reforms implemented. But it does resemble a stag hunt, in that there is a notion that 
the ultimate payoff only will be reached as long as everyone cooperates (CC). Further, there is 
also potential for a small gain for the country first to approach Lagarde with funds, since they 
might get something in return for breaking BRICS unity (DC). Finally, it can be argued that 
each would prefer to have everyone defecting (DD), i.e. everyone contributes together even 
though assurances are not given, rather than being the single country that does not contribute 
when everyone else does (CD), since that country might be punished for their defiance by the 
IMF later.           
 We therefore have a situation where our antecedent condition of overlapping interests 
is present. Thus, weak regime features become relevant. In this specific issue it seems that it is 
mostly an issue of lacking rules which can explain why their attempt at coordination failed. 
My reason for claiming this is first that evidence of converging beliefs of fact, causation and 
rectitude, i.e. principles, is present when it comes to the 2010 IMF reforms. As illustrated by 
their joint statements, they all agree on the importance of IFI reform in general, as well as in 
implementing the 2010 IMF reforms. They also agree on why this is important, emphasizing 
the need to make the IFIs more in sync with global economic realities and increasing 
participation from emerging and developing countries. Russia does not disagree with this.
 Second, beyond principles, the prevailing practice for implementing collective choice, 
i.e. decision-making procedures, seems to be sufficient in this instance As discussed in the 
beginning of the chapter, the decision-making procedures in the BRICS framework is rather 
un-institutionalized, and limited to meetings taking place on a semi-regular basis, but the quid 
pro quo attempt was discussed and agreed to at the annual summit in New Delhi, where all 
state leaders were present. There is no reason to believe that the cooperation attempt failed 
because of inadequate institutional structures, especially considering that this was a relative 
uncomplicated matter.          
 Third, concerning norms, it may be argued that the joint statement where they stated 
their intention indicates an expected behavior along the lines of “we do not contribute with 
bilateral loans to the IMF before we receive signals that the reforms agreed upon in 2010 will 
be implemented”. Traces of explicit rules are however absent, and I thus infer that a lack 
thereof might explain why the Russian deputy spilled the beans prematurely. Some might 
argue that perhaps he knew that the assurance would be given, and therefore though it was 
OK to disclose that Russia would contribute. Still, the reaction from the Indian and Brazilian 
diplomats suggests that they had quite another impression.    
 Except this specific issue, it seems that what have kept the BRICS from robustly 
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cooperating towards increasing emerging and developing economies’ influence in the IMF 
and the WBG is mostly that the issue at hand has not demanded it. Policy coordination and 
adjustment have not been necessary to realize their shared interest, since their interests seem 
to have been in a preexisting situation of harmony. However, this does not mean that their 
joint statements and rhetoric did not ultimately help realize their harmonious interests – it 
most likely did – but perhaps only in a limited degree. It is not impossible that the results 
described above would have been the same even if the countries had championed their 
interests alone instead. 
5.2 Increasing the utility of IFIs 
Together with the call for more influence, the early BRIC agenda included several issues that 
in varying degree can be put under the umbrella of increasing the utility of IFIs. All of these 
issues were laid out in a roadmap for reform presented in the BRIC finance ministers’ 
statement from their meeting in Horsham, in March 2009. Besides calling on restructuring IFI 
voting power, discussed above, the following issues were highlighted in the roadmap (BRICS 
2013, n.d.d): 
We consider that IMF resources are clearly inadequate and should be very significantly 
increased through various channels. Borrowing should be a temporary bridge to a permanent 
quota increase as the Fund is a quota-based institution. Hence we call for the completion of the 
next general review of quotas by January 2011. 
We also call for a substantial SDR allocation.
47
 
We deem it necessary to develop new credit facilities that could assist countries facing financial 
problems. Those new facilities would bear new and more flexible approaches to the issue of 
conditionality and have a precautionary dimension. 
The crisis has demonstrated that the Fund must strengthen its surveillance capability. To achieve 
this goal, we emphasize the importance of better-focused even-handed surveillance across all 
IMF members, especially in respect to advanced economies with major international financial 
centers and large cross-border capital flows. 
We call for the study of developments in the international monetary system, including the role 
of reserve currencies. This would help clarify the role of the Fund in the international economy 
in light of lessons drawn from the crisis. 
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 In addition to being the unit of account in the IMF, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is an international reserve 
asset based on a basket of major currencies. It was created by the IMF in 1969 in order to support the fixed 
exchange rate system and lessen the dependency on gold and the U.S. Dollar. When the floating exchange rate 
system later was adopted, the need for SDR lessened, so today it mostly functions as the IMF’s unit of account. 
The allocation of SDRs to members in the IMF is proportionate to their IMF quota (IMF, 2014g). On May 30 
2014, $1 equaled SDR 0.65.  
 51 
 
We also call for the swift activation of the IMF's new income model, including the speeding up 
of the process required for the sale of a portion of the Fund's gold. 
To fulfil a countercyclical role in the present circumstances, the World Bank should raise 
substantive resources from the global capital markets in order to enhance its lending capacity, 
including in support to trade finance. It will also need to relax the present single borrower limit 
and provide new funding for infrastructure projects in low and middle income countries. 
As is obvious, the issues under the umbrella of increasing IFI utility are quite distinct. It 
makes sense to organize the issues under the same subchapter, but they cannot be discussed 
together. So instead of first presenting the issue and its trajectory and then discussing it in the 
context of interests and, if relevant, regime features as I did above and will in the following 
two subchapters as well, I have organized this subchapter into five sections (four of the issues 
is discussed alone, and three discussed together), where both the presentation of the issue and 
the analysis is done more or less simultaneously.     
 Before I continue it is useful to note that many of the points discussed below are 
merely calls on the IFIs to do things rather than issues demanding specific action or behavior 
on behalf of the BRIC(S). This especially applies to the allocation of Special Drawing Rights, 
the need for new credit facilities, the call on the IMF to sell some of its gold, the call for 
studying developments in the international monetary system and to some degree the 
strengthening of the IMF’s surveillance capability. Moreover, several of the points are not 
specific “BRIC(S) points”; most of them were indeed sound measures in order to mitigate the 
financial crisis. It is nonetheless useful to discuss these issues, since in sum they make up a 
significant part of BRIC(S) interaction towards reforming IFIs. However, in terms of interests 
it is mostly meaningful to explain why it was in BRIC(S)’ interest to call for such changes 
rather than to discuss it in the context of policy coordination. This being said, where relevant I 
will make the case that the aligning policies we see were to a large degree a result of pre-
existing harmony.  
5.2.1 Increasing the resources of the IMF 
The first point stated in roadmap, the need to increase the resources of the IMF, was 
acknowledged by fellow G20 leaders shortly after the meeting in Horsham, at the G20 summit 
in London in April 2009. Here it was decided to “treble resources available to the IMF to 
$750 billion” (G20 Research Group, n.d.c). Half a year later, when G20 leaders met for the 
Pittsburgh Summit in Pennsylvania, the trebling – from $250 billion to $750 billion – was 
implemented (G20 Research Group, n.d.a).        
 The increase came in the form of a substantial revamping of the IMF’s New 
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Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). The NAB, as well as the General Arrangements to Borrow 
(GAB), is arrangements the IMF has with states and institutions (mostly national banks) that 
it can turn to should its resources obtained from the allocation of IMF quotas fall short of the 
needs of member countries. Currently there are 38 members in the NAB, including all five 
BRICS countries. The BRIC and South Africa became members in 2009, in conjunction with 
the increase of NAB funds. In Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the unit of account used in the 
IMF, the NAB consists of SDR 370 billion (approx. $575 billion). Out of the five countries 
China contributes with SDR 31.2 billion, Brazil with SDR 8.7 billion, India with SDR 8.7 
billion, Russia with SDR 8.7 billion and South Africa – which was not part of the grouping at 
the time of their contribution – with SDR 340 million (IMF, 2014h). The NAB funds are kept 
by each contributor, and first made available when the IMF activates the arrangement. When 
it does so, it can borrow the amount allocated towards the arrangement from each member. 
The NAB has been activated a total of eight times since it was implemented in 1998; seven of 
them taking place since 2011.        
 At first glance it might seem odd that the BRIC and South Africa decided to become 
members and contributors to the NAB. They are part of a larger group of countries that are 
very little interested in utilizing funds from the IMF (Fourcade, 2013), so it can’t be explained 
by a potential need for IMF funds in the future. At the same time, it would not make sense to 
contribute to the NAB on the basis of needing such help in the future anyways. As opposed to 
contributing through a quota increase, which would mean increasing the limit of available 
finance more than the actual increase because members can borrow up to 200% of its quota 
annually and 600% cumulatively (IMF, 2014a), the NAB funds does not increase the access 
to finance. From this perspective it would therefore make more sense to hold onto the funds 
and avoid the risk of potentially dealing with IMF conditionality.    
 The most likely explanation as to why they contributed is because of what the 
contribution represented. In the finance ministers’ statement from Horsham they underlined 
that borrowing – such as through the NAB – should only be a bridge to an increase in quotas, 
“as the Fund is a quota-based institution” (BRICS 2013, n.d.d). Because the IMF is a quota-
based institution – quotas decide the amount of voting power, how much each country shall 
contribute and how much it can borrow from the IMF – increasing IMF funds has generally 
meant increasing the amount of quotas. Increasing the amount of quotas in turn means that 
quotas are realigned, since the quota formula is based on relative economic positions in the 
world. When the IMF turn to arrangements such as the NAB as a means to increase their 
resources, rather than increase quotas, the status quo in terms of power are kept in the 
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institution. Hence, when BRIC finance ministers called on the IMF to increase its funds, with 
the caveat that this mainly should be through an increase in quotas, it must be understood in 
light of their interest in increasing their influence. Viewing the NAB as a “bridge to a 
permanent quota increase” (BRICS, 2013, n.d.d), it is likely that the decision to contribute to 
the NAB was based on a notion that this increased their leverage in the institution, and the 
likelihood in getting what later became the 2010 IMF reforms accepted.   
 Since the BRIC’s decision to propose and contribute towards revamping IMF 
resources can be explained by the same argument of increasing their IFI influence discussed 
in the first subchapter, the same argument of harmony of interests should apply as well. Even 
though the increase in resources was unprecedented, BRIC and South Africa’s contribution 
“fits” with what we previously found to be a more or less autonomous policy of reforming 
IFIs followed by all five countries before BRIC, and later BRICS, interaction began.  
5.2.2 Increasing the resources of the World Bank 
As was the case in increasing IMF resources, the need to increase the funds of the WB was 
also acknowledged by fellow world leaders at the G20 summit in London. In the summit 
statement it said that they had agreed to “support at least $100 billion of additional lending by 
the MDBs” (G20 Research Group, n.d.c).       
 BRIC’s and South Africa’s interest in increasing the funds of the WB is a bit more 
complex than what was the case in the issue discussed above. First of all, all five countries 
utilize WB funds in a significant degree, and are thus likely to continue doing so until they 
reach a certain level of development. As of today, China has a total of 227 loans in the IBRD, 
totaling at $31.8 billion, India has 94 loans, totaling at $27.6 billion, Brazil has 133 loans, 
totaling at $22.2 billion, Russia has 36 loans, totaling at $5 billion, and South Africa has 1 
loan of $3.76 billion (WBG, 2014a). Relative to GDP, Brazil is the biggest lender out of the 
five countries. Their combined loans represent 0.91% of their GDP. South Africa is the 
second biggest, with their single loan representing 0.63% of their GDP. India then follows 
with 0.55%, China with 0.23% and Russia with 0.19%.
48
      
 The fact that the five countries are current borrowers does not necessarily translate into 
them calling on the WB to increase their resources. However, the issue relating to the 
financial crisis that perhaps has hurt the five countries the most is the capital flight from their 
economies. Particularly capital towards key development projects, for instance improving 
infrastructure, has been hard to come by (Mazundar, 2014). This increases the importance of 
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 These figures have been calculated based on the following GDP figures: China $13.37 trillion, India $4.96 
trillion, Russia $2.55 trillion, Brazil $2.42 trillion and South Africa $595 billion (CIA, n.d.). 
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the WB and other MDBs, which can offer loans specifically towards this end. Realizing that 
the level of contribution from private capital is uncertain in the future, it makes sense to call 
on MDBs to increase their resources. Indeed, based on their joint rhetoric it actually seems 
that this was the case. In the statement from Horsham, BRIC finance ministers also said that 
“we note that the crisis has led to a massive withdrawal of private capital in 2009 and this is 
likely to continue in 2010. It is imperative that multilateral financial institutions should 
expand their lending to offset the massive decline” (BRICS 2013, n.d.d)   
 The explanation of needing more from the WB in the future is also somewhat backed up 
by comparing the number of loans granted to the BRIC countries and South Africa pre and 
post 2009 – which is more or less the time when the effects of the financial crisis started to 
become notable, as well as the year the BRIC first called on the WB to increase its funds. 
From 2009-2013 China had 70 IBRD loans approved by the WB’s Board of Directors, 
compared to 51 from 2004-2008. Brazil had 61 and 51, respectively, India had 29 and 26, 
respectively, and South Africa’s single loan was approved in 2010. Russia is the exception 
with 6 and 8, respectively (WBG, 2014b).       
 Generally, the WB finance it’s lending to its members by selling bonds to private and 
institutional investors in the many financial markets of the world (WBG, 2012). Similar 
capital raising arrangements is the case in other MDBs, for instance in the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank Group (ADBG) (ADB, n.d; African 
Development Bank Group, n.d). So when the BRIC called on the WB to increase its funds, 
this can be understood just as much as a call on the Bank to do its part, as something 
depending and indicating BRIC action. The exception is when members are asked to 
contribute themselves. This was the case in 2010, when G20 leaders implemented their 
decision from 2009 to increase the lending of MDBs. In total the IBRD got its general capital 
(meaning capital from shareholders) increased with $86.2 billion. The tab was distributed 
onto WB members relative to their amount of shares in the institution.    
  From one point of view, this might seem counterintuitive. Why call for an increase in 
resources if this potentially means having to pick up some of the tab? In this respect it is 
important to note that the amount of contribution is significantly lower than what is, and can, 
be borrowed. Out of the $86.2 billion, only $5.1 billion was paid-in capital, i.e. what was 
actually paid to the WB. The rest of the money came as callable capital, meaning guarantees 
of capital. This is capital the WB can lend against, but only ask to be transferred to the WB in 
case of an emergency, for instance under the threat of bankruptcy (Moss, Staats, and 
Barmeier, 2011). The WB has never had to draw on its callable capital. So, excluding the 
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guarantees, what BRIC and South Africa actually paid to the WB in the general capital 
increase ranged from less than fifty million dollars for South Africa to a couple of hundred 
million dollars for China, which is only a fraction of what the five countries borrow from the 
WB. Another point linked to this is that capital contributions towards the WB has a 
tremendous multiplier effect, a $1 contribution from the U.S., for instance, enables over $30 
in new lending (Ibid.).
49
  This also explains the general logic of contributing to an MDB even 
in situations where you are going to need financing from that bank.  
 Perhaps most important; out of the $86.2 billion, $27.8 billion was tied to the 
realignment of voting power in the IBRD, where developing and transitional countries 
(DTCs) increased their voting power with 3.13%. The reason for this is that the WB follows 
the same logic as the IMF, where voting power and contributions are tied together. So when 
voting power was realigned, new contributions had to be made, meaning that the BRIC and 
South Africa had to pay up in order for the changes in voting power to be implemented. 
 The explanation for the BRIC’s call on the WB to increase its funds can thus be 
understood as a function of them needing the type of finance the WB can offer, coupled with 
an understanding of perhaps needing more than in previous years in the nearby future. Their 
subsequent contribution to the general capital increase can also be seen in light of this, as well 
as in their interest in getting the change in voting power in the IBRD implemented. 
 So, was this all an issue of harmonious interests? First of all, in principle the call on the 
WB to increase its funds in itself does not demand joint action from the BRIC, given that the 
WB usually do this by selling bonds and not by asking for contributions from shareholders. 
But as we saw above, this was not the case in 2010. Moreover, the increase in the WB’s 
general capital was the first increase in over twenty years (WBG, 2010a), and thus 
unprecedented. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate to which degree BRIC policies towards 
contributing needed to be adjusted, or were originally in harmony.  
 Nevertheless, two issues point to the latter. Since parts of the increase was linked to the 
realignment of voting power in the IBRD, BRIC’s contribution – as was the case regarding 
the NAB as well – must be understood in the context of increasing emerging and developing 
countries influence in the IBRD, which we previously have argued is an issue of harmony. 
Second, the increase in the general capital was critical for the IBRD to function. Without it, 
“drastic cuts in the Bank’s lending would have been on the horizon” (WBG, 2010d), 
according to the Chairman of the WBG’s Development Committee, Al Khalifa. Based on a 
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 This is based on the U.S. having around 16% of the sharer in the WB, and that the WB maintains a 20 % loan-
equity ratio (Moss, Staats and Barmeier, 2011). 
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notion of harmonious policies towards utilization of WB funds – because the countries 
borrowed also before they began interacting – we can assume that when it became obvious 
that the WB needed an increase in their general capital to stay afloat, the initial and 
autonomous response of the BRIC’s was more or less the same, and not something that had to 
be adjusted to become compatible.        
 Even though the WB substantially increased its resources in 2010, the countries, also 
after South Africa joined the group in 2011, have continued calling of the WB and other 
MDBs to increase their resources, and every summit declaration has included more or less the 
same point, here from the New Delhi summit declaration: 
In the current global economic environment, we recognise that there is a pressing need for 
enhancing the flow of development finance to emerging and developing countries. We therefore 
call upon the World Bank to give greater priority to mobilising resources and meeting the needs 
of development finance while reducing lending costs and adopting innovative lending tools. 
(BRICS 2013, n.d.b).          
The importance of MDB’s was an issue at the fifth summit in Durban in 2013, but then also as 
parts of the plans to establish a BRICS development bank. I will return to this in the last 
subchapter.   
5.2.3 Improving the IMF’s surveillance capabilities 
Surveillance of the economic and financial policies of the individual member states in the 
IMF as well as of the global economy as a whole is one of the key functions of the IMF. 
Through this surveillance they try to foresee risk and threats to stability, and based on their 
findings they provide policy advice to those it concerns. Much of the surveillance is done 
through closely monitoring each IMF member’s policies, especially their exchange rate, 
monetary, fiscal and financial policies. As part of their monitoring, IMF representatives 
usually meet with member states’ governments annually to exchange views, and execute what 
is known as Article IV
50
 consultations.       
 As we perhaps should expect, the issue of surveillance is a contested one. Which 
economic and financial features the surveillance should be aimed at, measures and notions for 
and of what sound economic and financial policies are, and what the implications of the 
surveillance’s results should be, are the most controversial issues.    
 BRIC’s point concerning the need to increase surveillance towards advanced 
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 Article IV in the IMF’s charter concerns “Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements”. It has five sections 
which in various ways describe the relationship between the IMF and member countries and what is expected in 
terms of behavior from each part (IMF, 2014c). 
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economies was nonetheless to some degree acknowledged by their fellow world leaders at the 
G20 summit in London in April 2009. The summit statement emphasized that the leaders 
would “support, now and in the future, to candid, even-handed, and independent IMF 
surveillance of our economies and financial sectors, of the impact of our policies on others, 
and of risks facing the global economy” (G20 Research Group, n.d.c).   
 The statement indicated a new surveillance framework in the near future. Out of the 
BRIC, this was particularly a victory for China, which was very unpleased with the existing 
framework. This framework, which had been adopted in 2007, included features which 
indirectly put China’s supposed practice of currency manipulation in the line of fire. The 
features were proposed and championed by the U.S. and basically instructed IMF staff to 
employ a methodology in their surveillance bound to result in criticism of Chinese monetary 
policies (Brütsch and Papa, 2013, p. 314).        
 The positive signals from the G20 statement became concrete results in June 2009, 
when the IMF revised its 2007 surveillance decision, most notably by removing “the 
requirement [for IMF staff] to use specific terms such as “fundamental misalignment”” 
(Brütsch and Papa, 2013, pp. 315-316) in their surveillance. Then, in 2012, larger revisions 
were introduced when the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) was adopted. Regarding 
BRIC’s demand of special attention towards advanced economies, the ISD can be seen as a 
compromise between advanced and emerging and developing economies. The most important 
change from the old to the new framework was the new focus on multilateral surveillance and 
the effect a member’s policies has on conditions outside its own borders. Specifically, the new 
framework “allows the IMF to discuss with a member country the full range of spillovers 
from its policies when they may have a significant impact on global stability” (IMF, 2013). 
This does not directly answer to BRIC’s request, but emphasizing multilateral issues in a 
larger degree opens up for relatively more focus on advanced economies than less advanced 
economies, because the former tend to have a greater “impact on global stability” (Ibid.) than 
the latter.           
 Why the BRIC would want more attention towards advanced economies is rather 
obvious. Better surveillance of advanced economies means more information about, and 
scrutiny towards, these economies. More information means that the BRIC can better insulate 
themselves from shocks from these advanced economies’ markets, while more scrutiny means 
that the risk for such shocks becomes smaller. By the same token, it is natural that advanced 
economies, i.e. the Western world, would oppose increased surveillance towards their 
economies due to considerations of sovereignty and autonomy.    
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 Regarding harmonious or overlapping interests, Brütsch and Papa describes the 
decision to include the surveillance point in the BRIC statement from Horsham as Brazil, 
Russia, and India “formally endors[ing] China’s call” (2013, p. 315) for increased 
surveillance of advanced economies. The reason for this is the 2007 surveillance decision and 
the currency dispute between China and the U.S, which the point in the joint statement must 
be seen in light of. When China was faced with the proposed amendment in 2007, they argued 
that this was not only features that would hurt China, but emerging and developing states in 
general. Based on this, they called on the emerging and developing world to help them block 
the amendment. These attempts ultimately failed. This failure can in turn be used as an 
argument for disagreement between the BRIC in 2007, and thus policy coordination taking 
place in 2009. However, at the time of the 2007 decision, BRIC only held 11% of total voting 
power in the IMF – well below the needed 15% to block significant decisions. Coupled with 
the fact that transcripts and minutes from meetings in the IMF’s Executive Board are 
confidential, it is, as Brütsch and Papa also acknowledge “impossible to verify how far the 
other BRICs … [went] in supporting China’s demands” (2013, p. 315).   
 Moreover, the issues in which Brütsch and Papa (2013) doubts the level of BRIC unity 
is not directly the same as the issue of increasing surveillance towards advanced economies. 
There is nothing that suggests that Russia, India and Brazil cannot want a bit more scrutiny 
towards China’s currency policy and at the same time want to increase surveillance towards 
advanced economies.          
 Another important point is that the world was a fundamentally different place in 2009 
than in 2007. Assuming for a moment that BRIC’s policies towards surveillance of advanced 
economies actually were in discord in 2007, chances are that they were adjusted all by 
themselves because of the financial crisis, and not specifically because of the BRIC 
framework and China’s effort. With the financial crisis as backdrop, it makes perfect sense for 
all four countries to autonomously have adopted a policy of better surveillance of advanced 
economies.           
 And even if there were some adjustments taking place, and Brazil, Russia and India 
were persuaded by China to push for better surveillance towards advanced economies, the 
potential gains of defecting still points to a situation of harmony. Albeit, since the issue of 
surveillance represents a conflict of interest between advanced states on the one hand and 
emerging and developing countries on the other, there are actors that can provide gains for 
defecting – the U.S. could for instance provide incentives for Brazil, India and Russia not to 
join China’s bandwagon – it is unlikely that there was much to be gained in this specific 
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situation. First, it is difficult to identify gains larger than more scrutiny and information 
towards advanced economies – depending on this ultimately leading to less financial volatility 
for the BRIC – being offered by the U.S. or some other advanced economy. Second, the U.S. 
alone and the EU alone have enough voting power to block any major decision in the IMF, so 
it does not make sense for them to spend resources getting one or more of Brazil, Russia and 
India to defect – except in a situation where they cared about legitimacy and wanted to have 
broad support of their stance.         
 In sum, the doubts of policies actually being coordinated as well as the presumed 
absence of gains from defecting points towards harmonious interests. 
5.2.4 Allocation of IMF Special Drawing Rights 
SDRs – beyond being the unit of account in the IMF – functions as an international reserve 
asset. It is not a currency in itself, or a claim towards the IMF, but rather a claim towards the 
“freely usable currencies of IMF members” (IMF, 2014g). This means that an IMF member 
can exchange their SDRs with another member’s usable currency, and thus increase its 
liquidity.          
 BRIC’s call on a “substantial SDR allocation” (BRICS 2013, n.d.d) was also 
acknowledged and endorsed by fellow G20 leaders when they met in London in April 2009 
(G20 Research Group, n.d.c). Only a few months later, in late August and in the beginning of 
September, one general allocation and one special allocation was made, increasing the amount 
of SDRs from 21.4 billion to 204 billion (equivalent to approx. $316 billion as of March 
2014) (IMF, 2014g). The SDRs was allocated to individual IMF members based on their 
quota amount. Based on individual needs, they could either use it or hold onto it.   
 The allocation in 2009 took place to mitigate the effect of the financial crisis, and is a 
much more trivial issue than those previously discussed. No further explanation as to why the 
BRIC would want SDR allocation was given in the statement, but the reason for why the 
BRIC countries called for it is not particularly difficult to deconstruct:  it would increase their 
own foreign reserves and, perhaps more important, help curb the financial crisis. It is thus 
obvious that this was not an issue that was particular contested, and something that was in the 
interests of most of, if not the whole, membership in the IMF.     
 Since the situation was extraordinary and unprecedented,
51
 no previous policies on the 
matter can be expected to have existed. This way it may be argued that policies had to be 
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 Beyond the relative increase being huge, this was only the third general allocation in the history of SDRs. The 
previous took place in installments from 1979-81. It was also by far the largest; the other two only amounted to 
SDR 9.3 billion and 12.1 billion respectively (IMF, 2014g). 
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coordinated. It is nonetheless a bit awkward to discuss if this was the case, since there is no 
reason to believe that individual BRIC members’ attitude towards SDR allocation had to be 
adjusted to become more in line with one another, since the upside to the allocation is so 
obvious and the downside so hard to find. Again, this applies not only to the BRIC but to the 
whole membership.          
 By the same token, it is difficult to find any gains from defecting, i.e. resisting SDR 
allocation. When SDR allocations take place, the SDRs are offered “costless and 
unconditional” (IMF, 2014g) by the IMF. In other words, there are no resources that can be 
saved should the allocation not take place. It is also hard to imagine any rewards to be had by 
resisting the allocation, not to say who should be expected to provide them. Had the SDRs 
been injected into the global economy the same way as a national bank injects money into its 
national economy, it would have been another issue, since we could expect some states 
opposing the allocation due to inflationary considerations. This is not the case, though.  
5.2.5 The call on the IMF to introduce flexible credit facilities, study the international 
monetary system and implement its new income model 
Beyond the four more or less substantial issues discussed above, three of the seven points 
presented in Horsham – although relevant under the umbrella of increasing IFI utility – are 
too trivial and general in order to meaningful discuss them as attempts at joint action, and 
consequently in the context of policy coordination. This being said, it is nonetheless useful to 
try and explain, from the perspective of shared interests, why the BRIC emphasized these 
three issues in their joint statement.        
 The first of these three issues concerned the IMFs credit facilities, where they called 
for new facilities that were flexible in terms of conditionality.52 From the point of view of 
BRIC interests, this point actually is a bit difficult to explain, since, based on their general 
resistance towards borrowing from the IMF, they are unlikely to ever utilize such facilities 
themselves. This being said, the IMF introducing such facilities is not incompatible with 
BRIC interests. The statement in itself does not indicate a special contribution from the BRIC 
(although the subsequent contribution to the NAB can be linked to this), and it is not much 
more than a call on the IMF to implement facilities that are not as demanding in terms of 
conditionality. Moreover, the cost of including such a point in their joint statement, measured 
in political capital, is miniscule. Thus the potential gain does not need to be particularly large 
either, since the investment is so small. Based on this logic, the following two explanations 
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seem plausible: first, such facilities would probably help mitigate the financial crisis, which 
obviously is in the interest of the BRIC countries (and as with the SDRs, in the interest of 
every other state in the world as well). Second, calling on the IMF to ease conditionality is 
both part of the general argument of “reforming the IMF”, as well as an act of solidarity with 
low income countries that are not in a position of saying no to financial assistance from the 
IMF.            
 The second of these three issues concerned the international monetary system, where 
the BRIC called for the IMF to study its development, including the role of reserve currencies. 
First of all, this statement does not really reveal a specific agenda, since it merely calls for the 
issue to be studied by the IMF. Later statements have been along the same lines, and they only 
seem to share the general notion that the world needs a “broad-based international reserve 
currency system providing stability and certainty” (BRICS, 2013, n.d.d). In fact there have 
been many indications that the BRIC(S) to some degree have incompatible interests when it 
comes to reserve currencies, especially concerning their view of the U.S. Dollar.
53
 However, 
this has not really been an issue where the BRIC, and later BRICS, have stated or strongly 
indicated their intentions to cooperate, and is also somewhat outside the issue of reforming 
IFIs. Therefore, I will not expand any further on this issue here.    
 The third of these three issues called on the IMF to swiftly sell some of its gold and 
activate its new income model. This is perhaps the most trivial of all seven issues on the 
roadmap from Horsham, and was just a call on the IMF to implement rather uncontroversial 
and uncomplicated measures already agreed to in the membership. The new income model 
referred to was endorsed by the Executive Board in April 2008. It was aimed at putting the 
institution on a “solid financial footing” (IMF, 2008c), and secure future sustainably. To this 
end, the selling of some of the IMF’s gold holdings was the key element. In December 2010, 
the IMF sold 403.3 metric tons of gold, approximately one eight of their holdings (which is 
the third largest in the world). Most of the funds raised from the sale were put in an 
endowment aimed at providing future financial stability for the institution, while a proportion 
were used to subsidize financing for low-income countries (IMF, 2014i). 
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 A thorough analysis of BRICS’ approach to reserve currencies is offered by Brütsch and Papa (2013). Of the 
BRICS, Russia has been the most vocal in changing the current system where the U.S. Dollar serves as the 
world’s main reserve currency. China has also voiced their discontent with Washington’s exorbitant privilege, 
but has threaded carefully due to competing considerations, while India, Brazil and South Africa have been 
lukewarm in calling for change (Ibid.). 
 62 
 
5.2.6 Harmonious interests  
With increasing the resources of the IMF and the WBG as exceptions, the points discussed 
above under the umbrella of increasing the utility of IFIs are issues that did not demand or 
suggest joint BRIC(S) action of any significant kind. Most issues discussed were just calls on 
the IFIs to do their part to mitigate the effect of the financial crisis. Moreover, several of the 
issues highlighted were indeed sound measures that would benefit the IFI membership as a 
whole, and not issues that represented a specific conflict of interest between BRIC(S) on the 
one hand and the developed world on the other. These issues therefore range from being 
issues of BRIC(S) harmony to being issues of more or less global harmony.   
  At the same time, it is useful to see every BRIC(S) call towards the IFIs to increase 
their utility and strengthen its function as a means to elevate their general influence level. As 
Brütsch and Papa sums up nicely, here with regards to the IMF:  
For many, the call to strengthen the IMF added insult to injury [cf. conditionality] … Yet 
among the BRIC(S), neither the G20 nor the IMF was particularly controversial. Each of the 
five countries had a seat at the relevant tables, and … each recognized the Fund’s usefulness … 
At the diplomatic level, moreover, the BRICS had little to lose. Their efforts to strengthen the 
IMF would either flounder and expose western obstinacy, or succeed and entrench them more 
firmly in one of the prime sites of global economic governance. (2013, p. 314)   
5.3 Ending the West’s stranglehold on IFI leader positions 
Traditionally there has been a tacit agreement that the IMF leader is European and the WBG 
leader American. This tradition goes all the way back to the establishment of the two 
institutions, in the mid-1940s. Including the now Managing Director of the IMF, the French 
Christine Lagarde, there have been five directors from France, two from Sweden, and one 
from Spain, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium.       
 As the issues discussed above, the BRIC first jointly challenged this norm when their 
finance ministers met for the second time in Horsham, in March 2009. Here they said that “it 
[is] … imperative that the next heads of the IMF and the World Bank be selected through 
open merit-based processes, irrespective of nationality or regional considerations” (BRICS, 
2013, n.d.b). The same message was repeated when BRIC leaders met for the first time in 
Yekaterinburg some months later, and in various forms in almost every joint statement from 
both leaders and finance ministers since then, also after South Africa became part of the 
grouping.           
 The need to have a merit-based, open and transparent process was also something that 
was acknowledged by fellow G20 leaders at the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, and 
they agreed the that the next change in leadership should be handled in such a manner (G20 
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Research Group, n.d.c).         
 The first change in IFI leadership after interaction between the BRICS began took 
place in May 2011, when the Managing Director of the IMF, the Frenchman Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, stepped down after allegations of sexual assault on a hotel employee in New 
York. He was arrested on May 15 and resigned his position on May 18. Six days after he 
resigned, the directors representing the BRICS at the IMF’s Executive Board released a joint 
statement laying out their “common understanding concerning the selection of the next 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund” (Reuters, 2011). In the statement they 
mainly reiterated familiar points of merit and transparency, but they also criticized European 
officials for indicating that the next leader should be European, and reminded them of 
previous statements by Jean-Claude Juncker, the then president of the Eurogroup of finance 
ministers, which in the context of the previous election had said that Strauss-Kahn probably 
would be the “last European to become director of the IMF in the foreseeable future” (Ibid.). 
 According to the BRICS representatives’ rhetoric, you might expect the five countries 
to present a candidate of their own, or jointly endorse a candidate that challenged the 
established norm of the leader being European. None of this happened however, and soon 
there was two main contenders that materialized themselves and was shortlisted; Lagarde and 
Augustin Carstens, Governor of the Bank of Mexico.      
 The power to elect an IMF leader has been outsourced from the IMF’s Board of 
Governors to the Executive Board. If needed, the Board can select a candidate by the casting 
of votes, but they aim for consensus and, according to the organization itself, this has “been 
the case in previous selection rounds” (IMF, 2014j). Deliberations in the Executive Board are 
not disclosed so we cannot now the exact positions of the various directors when the issue of 
who should replace Strauss-Kahn was discussed. Emphasizing BRICS rhetoric, you would 
expect Carstens to be their preferred choice, based on the simple reason that he is not 
European. Nevertheless, China, Russia and Brazil all publicly backed Lagarde before the 
executive directors met to take the final decision (Beattie, 2011; Versiani and Marcello, 2011; 
Ria Novosti, 2011). Reports from India in the build up to the election suggested that they 
would do the same when the executive directors would meet, something that was confirmed 
by India’s finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee, after Lagarde had been chosen 
(moneycontrol.com, 2011). Since the decision to go with Lagarde presumably was made in 
consensus, South Africa could not have opposed her candidacy. Their Finance Minister, 
Gordhan, also expressed his support for her appointment after she was elected (Miti, 2011).
 When push came to shove, the BRICS were unable to rally around a viable candidate 
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to challenge Europe’s inevitable bid for the position and business as usual, in the form of 
anther French leader, prevailed.         
 In the aftermath, the extraordinary situation has been blamed for the outcome. The 
change in leadership was not scheduled. It was only a matter of days from the time Strauss-
Kahn’s resignation became an option till he actually resigned. Indian and Brazilian diplomats 
said that they were caught by surprise and didn’t have time to coordinate a joint approach 
between them, but so was the U.S. and the EU, argues Stuenkel (2011), and they were able to 
quickly endorse the candidacy of Lagarde. Moreover, the joint statement from the BRICS 
directors in the Executive Board concerning the election, weakens the credibility of the 
excuse of having too little time to coordinate between them, even though it probably still 
mattered in some degree, since such a decision need to be coordinated by governments, not 
only diplomats.           
 The next change in IFI leadership after the BRICS had expressed their aim of ending 
the West’s privilege, took place in 2012, when the time came to find a successor to the WBG 
leader Robert Zoellick. As opposed to the extraordinary departure of Strauss-Kahn, it had 
been known for quite some time that Zoellick was going to step down after his first five year 
term. The BRICS thus had plenty of time to agree on a candidate to back. The New Delhi 
summit, in late March, was also conveniently scheduled in the build up to the election, which 
was scheduled for late April. The BRICS would have little else to put the blame on other than 
disagreement should they fail to identify a candidate they could all endorse.   
 By the time of the New Delhi summit, three candidates had already materialized. If 
this was the reason that the BRICS did not present a “BRICS candidate” is difficult to know. 
Notably they did not use the opportunity the summit represented to reach a conclusion on who 
to jointly back by the three nominated candidates either. They merely said that “we welcome 
the candidatures from developing world for the position of the President of the World Bank” 
(BRICS 2013, n.d.b), without mentioning a specific candidate. The developing world 
candidates they referred to was the Latin American nominee, previous Finance Minister of 
Colombia, José Antonio Ocampo, and the African nominee, Finance Minister of Nigeria, 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iwela. The third candidate was the American nominee, the president of 
Dartmouth College, Jim Yong Kim.        
 A week later, attempts at agreeing on a common candidate were confirmed, when the 
Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega disclosed that “we [Brazil] are working for the 
BRICS to have a joint position” (Otoni and Soto, 2012). By the time Mantega made these 
statements it was clear that South Africa was backing the candidacy of Okonjo-Iweala. The 
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other BRICS had not decided, but in essence South Africa’s early backing of Okonjo-Iweala 
meant that in order for the BRICS to act as a bloc, the remaining four countries would have to 
back Okonjo-Iweala as well.          
 Ultimately the attempts at coordination failed. Shortly after Mantega’s statement, 
Russia came out publicly backing Kim’s candidacy (Harding, Fontanella-Kahn and Leahy, 
2012). This was not something they had run by the other BRICS beforehand – in fact 
according to an Indian diplomat the Indian Government had first heard about Russia’s 
decision in the media (Stuenkel, 2012). After Ocampo stood down and gave his support to 
Okonjo-Iweala, it became a race between her and Kim. In addition to Russia, sources close to 
the WBG’s Board of Directors said that China and India also backed Kim in the deliberations 
(Bridges, 2012). In the end it was only Brazil that joined South Africa in voting for Okonjo-
Iweala, which got around 18 % of the total vote (Harding, England and Leahy, 2012). Kim 
thus won, and by doing so became the 12
th
 American to lead the Bank. 
5.3.1 Weak overlapping interests and weak regime features 
The attempts at agreeing on a joint position in the case of both IFI leader elections, which 
presumably – based on joint and individual members’ statements – was the BRICS’ ambition, 
ultimately failed. In case of the IMF election, all, except some doubts concerning the extent of 
South Africa’s support, ended up backing Lagarde – a candidate they only a month before had 
been critical of.  In the case of the WBG election, Brazil and South Africa supported the non-
Western option, while the Asian BRICS supported the Western one. In both instances they 
failed to put forth a candidate of their own.       
 These failures can be analyzed from two perspectives. The first perspective is from 
incompatible interests. The second is from weak regime features, given that there actually 
were overlapping interests.         
 First, regarding the issue of putting forth their own BRICS candidate, it can, from the 
perspective of increasing their IFI power, be argued that their interests were overlapping. 
Having a leader from the non-Western world is in general more likely to address the needs, 
goals and ambitions of the non-Western world than a Western candidate. To identify and rally 
around a shared candidate thus makes sense, since it can be assumed that such a candidate 
would be more sensitive to BRICS’ interests, should that person ultimately be elected At the 
same time, and contrary to this, Stuenkel has a very valid point when he, in the context of 
Lagarde’s early bid for the IMF position in 2011, argues that:  
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The hard truth is that finding a “BRICS-candidate” might be all but impossible given the BRICS 
members countries’ often differing opinions, strategic interests and points of view. China, the 
world’s second largest economy and the IMF’s third largest contributor (after the United States 
and Japan), may see little difference between a French and a Mexican candidate. In the same 
way, Brazilians may feel no incentive to spend political capital in a fight for a Singaporean 
candidate. Brazil may even seek to undermine an Argentinean or Mexican candidate, in the 
same way that India may prefer a European to a Chinese Managing Director. (2011).  
Obviously, this argument also applies to the failed attempts at agreeing on a candidate among 
someone that was not their own picking, such as in the case of Lagarde vs. Carstens and Kim 
vs. Okonjo-Iweala.           
 In the former, it is likely that Brazil never really thought seriously of backing Carstens, 
even though they welcomed his bid for the position (Colitt, 2011). After they had backed 
Lagarde, Brazil said that they had done so much because of her commitment to IMF reforms 
(Versiani and Marcello, 2011). China is also believed to have backed Lagarde because they 
thought she would be more successful than Carstens in getting the 2010 IMF reforms 
implemented (Beattie, 2011). It is likely that at least India and Russia shared the same 
sentiment. When Lagarde was elected, India’s finance minister said that she was “eminently 
suited” (moneycontrol.com, 2011) for the job, while Russia’s finance minister said he thought 
she had “all the necessary qualities” (Rushe and Chrisafis, 2011).    
 In sum it seems that the reason for why Lagarde was backed and not Carstens, mainly 
was an issue of Lagarde serving the interests of the BRICS, at least the BRIC, better than 
Carstens. So the failure to back the non-Western candidate was most likely not a function of 
weak regime features, but simply that it was not in their interest to back Carstens.  
 Some of the same logic applies to the race between Kim and Okonjo-Iweala as well, 
but with a few central caveats: Okonjo-Iweala was widely acknowledged as a much more 
qualified candidate than Kim, while Lagarde and Carstens was seen as more or less equally 
qualified candidates (Stuenkel, 2012). Moreover, the fact that South Africa – the only country 
among the BRICS that could be blamed for having geopolitical aversions against a candidate 
from Nigeria – backed Okonjo-Iweala from the get go, meant that there were no conflicts of 
interests such as the one between Brazil and Carstens in the IMF election. Finally, even 
though reforms in the WBG is still very much on the agenda, there was no single issue, as the 
2010 IMF reforms was in the IMF election, that could have been decisive in the BRICS 
countries’ decision regarding who to support. So in sum there are not many good reasons as to 
why the Asian BRICS did not back Okonjo-Iweala – even though the opposite argument of 
there being few good reasons as to why they should back her, beyond her being non-Western 
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and believed to be more qualified, also is valid. The level of overlapping interests should 
nonetheless be high enough in order to discuss the problem of weak regime features in a 
meaningful way.          
 As in most elections, key stakeholders are approached and courted by candidates that 
try to appear as attractive as possible. Thus, beyond the obvious need for policy coordination, 
there are potential gains from defecting since defectors might secure special treatment. In 
game theoretic terms, we may say that the issue of backing Okonjo-Iweala resembles a game 
of stag hunt, where cooperation (CC) is the best option, but will only be secured if everyone 
believes that the others will cooperate as well. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
uncertainties regarding Brazil’s,54 India’s, and China’s commitment to Okonjo-Iweala, gave 
an incentive for Russia to publicly defect (DC), with hopes of getting special treatment from 
Kim in return, should he be elected – which Russia must have assumed to be likely at that 
time. The same argument applies to China and India, which defected when the selection of a 
candidate was discussed in the WBG’s Board of Directors, albeit in a much lesser degree 
since they did not defect publicly beforehand.      
 So, which weak regime pillar(s) proved decisive in the failure to jointly back Okonjo-
Iweala? – Most likely a combination of weak rules and in lesser degree weak norms.  
 Concerning decision-making procedures, we should expect that the New Delhi summit 
represented sufficient institutional structures to help coordinate a relatively simple matter. 
Concerning principles it can be argued that the joint statement emphasizing an “open and 
merit based selection method, irrespective of nationality, for the heading positions of the IMF 
and the World Bank” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010), coupled with various other 
statements, such as those from the BRICS’ IMF directors regarding the IMF election, indicate 
a shared belief of fact and rectitude regarding the importance of electing a non-Western 
candidate.           
 Concerning norms, it may be argued that the statement “we welcome the candidatures 
from developing world for the position of the President of the World Bank” (BRICS 2013, 
n.d.b) indicate an expected behavior of backing Okonjo-Iweala, or Ocampo for that matter, 
but this is a stretch. Another example is the statement from the Brazilian Finance Minister 
Mantega when he said that “we are working for the BRICS to have a joint position” (Otoni 
and Soto, 2012), which sends a message – at least from Brazil’s side – of an expected 
common approach. But again, it might be a stretch to define it as a shared norm.  
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 Even though Brazil ended up supporting Okonjo-Iweala, they were long linked to Ocampo. Russia also 
released the news that they were backing Kim the same day Ocampo withdrew, on April 13 2012.  
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 Finally, there are no indications or evidence of rules being formulated and agreed to by 
the BRICS towards backing a candidate from the emerging or developing world as the next 
head of the World Bank Group.         
 Even though low levels of overlapping interests likely represent significant parts of the 
explanation as to why the BRICS did not put forth a candidate of their own in neither election, 
it is reasonable to assume that their interests to some degree are overlapping, and that weak 
regime features offer parts of the explanation as well. In this regard, although the issue of 
weak rules and norms highlighted in the case of backing Okonjo-Iweala obviously is relevant 
here as well, it is plausible that the low level of BRICS institutionalism, i.e. weak decision-
making procedures is the most important factor.      
 Unlike deciding whether to back a specific candidate or not, identifying and then 
agreeing on one out of many is quite time consuming and demanding in terms of resources. 
This was also what Indian and Brazilian diplomats hinted to in the aftermath of the abrupt 
departure of Strauss-Kahn. This does not mean that institutionalism beyond semi-regular 
summits and meetings would automatically facilitate the process of putting forth a BRICS 
candidate – but it would have offered a platform where potential candidates perhaps could 
have been identified more rapidly, and made the subsequent bargaining more efficient.  
 Should they ever present their own candidate, chances are that the next leader of either 
IFI is this candidate, since, as Stuenkel argues; “while Europe and the United States have 
enough votes to push through any candidate, it would have been difficult for them to reject a 
viable choice who enjoys full support of China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa” 
(2011). 
5.4 A BRICS Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
The reforms from 2010 in both IFIs were supposed to increase the influence and power of 
emerging and developing states vis-à-vis the developed world. Four years later, the IMF 
reforms are still not implemented, while the reforms in the IBRD have failed to substantially 
increase the influence of emerging and developed states vis-à-vis the developed world. In fact, 
an analysis by Vestergaard and Wade show that because countries that clearly do not fit the 
label of developing and transitional countries (DTCs) were put in that category, the gain in 
voting power for actual DTCs was smaller than the 3.13% that changed hands (2014). 
Moreover, if the U.S. Congress ever deems it fit to approve the necessary legislation to 
implement the IMF reforms, the real change between developed and emerging and developing 
countries will be much smaller than the 6 % that is indicated, because the change is also from 
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overrepresented countries to underrepresented countries. The G7 for instance loses only 1.8 % 
of their aggregate voting power (Ibid.).      
 Impatience, defiance, the need for complimentary structures, or most likely a 
combination of the above, have led to attempts from the BRICS at creating similar structures 
as the Bretton Wood Institutions. The first of these structures is a BRICS development bank. 
The idea of such a bank first surfaced when BRICS finance ministers met at a G20 ministerial 
in Mexico in February 2012 (Leahy and Lamont, 2012). At the New Delhi summit one month 
later, BRICS leaders said that they had tasked their finance ministers with evaluating the 
feasibility and viability of a joint development bank (BRICS 2013, n.d.b). The decision to 
establish the bank was then announced at the fifth BRICS summit, in Durban in March 2013. 
In their joint statement concerning their decision, they said that:  
We [consider] that developing countries face challenges of infrastructure development due to 
insufficient long-term financing and foreign direct investment, especially investment in capital 
stock. This constrains global aggregate demand. BRICS cooperation towards more productive 
use of global financial resources can make a positive contribution to addressing this problem … 
[the] development bank [will mobilize] resources for infrastructure and sustainable development 
projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, [supplementing] 
the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and 
development … The initial capital contribution to the bank should be substantial and sufficient 
for the bank to be effective in financing infrastructure. (BRICS, 2013, n.d.e) 
Beyond the justification of the bank, they did not disclose any details. The level of enthusiasm 
was nonetheless very high and the leaders applauded the initiative. Xi Jinping, China’s newly 
chosen president, said for instance that “the potential of Brics development is infinite” 
(England, 2013). Many observers were however quick to point to the obvious issues the 
BRICS failed to address: what should the start-up capital be, how much should each country 
contribute and where should it be located. Calls for such details were perhaps premature, and 
we should be careful in reading too much into it, since the decision to move forward with the 
plans seemingly was made in Durban.       
 However, by the time of writing, over a year after the Durban summit, official 
information concerning the bank has been rather limited. The joint statement from Durban 
concluded with saying that the leaders would review the progress with the bank when they 
met in September 2013, for the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. When they met there, a media 
note on their informal meeting said that “progress has been made in negotiating its [the 
bank’s] capital structure, membership, shareholding and governance. The Bank will have an 
initial subscribed capital of US$ 50 billion from the BRICS countries” (Ibid.). Then in, April 
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2014 when BRICS finance ministers met in Washington D.C., on the sidelines of a G20 
ministerial, South Africa’s Finance Minister Gordhan said that the five countries had “made 
very good progress on the new development bank and most of the formal documentation is 
ready … there will be a few issues left, which will be resolved between now and the middle of 
July when we hope the summit [in Fortaleza, Brazil] will take place” (Kelly and Simao, 
2014).           
 Probably based on the same mix of purpose as the development bank, the BRICS have 
also decided to establish a joint Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). This reserve 
arrangement will function as a financial safety net, and may solve short term liquidity crises, 
and stop them from becoming full-fledged financial crises, since the arrangement rapidly can 
increase the liquidity of a BRICS member in need. The funds of the CRA will be kept by each 
country as part of their own reserves, and “only in moment of crisis in one of the member 
countries’ economies will the contingency fund begin to operate, acting as a cushion or back 
up” (Stuenkel, 2013d).         
 The idea of the CRA was first stated on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Los Cabos, 
Mexico, in June 2012. BRICS leaders tasked their finance ministers with evaluating its 
feasibility, and after receiving promising signals, they decided to move forward with the 
plans. As with the development bank they announced the news at the summit in Durban. In 
their statement they said that:   
The establishment of a self-managed contingent reserve arrangement would have a positive 
precautionary effect, help BRICS countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures, provide 
mutual support and further strengthen financial stability. It would also contribute to 
strengthening the global financial safety net and complement existing international 
arrangements as an additional line of defence. We are of the view that the establishment of the 
CRA with an initial size of US $ 100 billion is feasible and desirable subject to internal legal 
frameworks and appropriate safeguards. (BRICS 2013, n.d.e). 
No timeline and further details were provided, but the finance ministers and central bank 
governors were tasked to move along with the plans.      
 When BRICS leaders disclosed the planned amount of start-up capital for the 
development bank in St. Petersburg in September 2013, they also made the share of 
contributions towards the CRA known: China is to provide the bulk of the money with $41 
billion, Brazil, India and Russia will contribute $18 billion each, while South Africa will 
contribute with the remaining $5 billion (Subramanian, 2013).     
 By the time of writing the last official news concerning the CRA was given in April 
2014, in relation to the BRICS finance ministers’ meeting in Washington D.C. Here, Brazil’s 
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Finance Minister Mantega said that “we’re … almost 90 percent of the way towards 
agreement. Formal documents are ready and we have the basis to reach 100 percent 
agreement before the summit [In Fortaleza, Brazil, in mid-July]” (Kelly and Simao, 2014). 
5.4.1 Rationale, degree of overlapping interests and gains of defecting 
The rationale behind the two BRICS IFI structures is, as indicated above, a combination of the 
two main recurrent themes in the issues discussed thus far: increasing influence and 
increasing IFI utility. As perhaps should be expected, it is the latter reason that have been 
emphasized by the BRICS themselves, as illustrated in their joint statements above. 
Arguments concerning its economic utility, especially regarding the development bank which 
has been subject to most attention, have also been underlined by notable observers, such as 
from Joseph Stiglitz, who has argued that:  
A new development bank is clearly needed. The infrastructure requirements in emerging-market 
economies and low-income countries are huge — 1.4-billion people still have no reliable 
electricity, 900-million lack access to clean water and 2.6-billion do not have adequate 
sanitation. About 2-billion people will move to cities in the next 25 years … To meet these and 
other challenges, infrastructure spending will have to rise from about $800bn to at least $2-
trillion a year in the coming decades or it will be impossible to achieve long-term poverty 
reduction and inclusive growth. (Stern, Stieglitz, Bhattacharya and Romani, 2013).  
However, if increased utility was the main factor, a central question arises: why not just give 
the money to the WB and the IMF, which in essence performs the exact same function, and 
avoid the hardship of establishing new institutions? Stuenkel argues that “while emerging 
powers seek a larger role within the existing framework [Bretton Woods Institutions], they do 
not feel established powers are willing to provide them with the adequate power and 
responsibility” (2013d). It is therefore reasonable to assess the development bank, and also the 
CRA, as just as much a function of revisionism and wanting more influence than of increasing 
IFI utility per se.           
 This being said, chances are that the five countries assess the importance of these two 
functions differently. In relative terms, South Africa is the country likely to emphasize the 
economic function the most. They have the smallest economy and thus the potential for 
greatest utilization. On the other end, China is the country most likely to emphasize the 
revisionary and increased influence function the most, since their relative economic utilization 
will be miles below that of South Africa, an economy twenty times smaller than China’s. This 
is perhaps especially true with regards to the CRA. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
China has the largest reserves in the world, totaling $3.8 trillion. A CRA of $100 billion, 
where China themselves provides almost half of it, will not make much of a difference for 
 72 
 
China. However, the nature of the global economy is such that the insolvency of a bank in 
Johannesburg can, in time and indirectly, severely hurt the Chinese economy. So even though 
the CRA does little to increase China’s financial safety directly, it increases it indirectly by 
creating a security net that can contain crises in the other BRICS and thus stop such crises 
from spreading and in time hurt the Chinese economy.     
 Based on India’s, Russia’s and Brazil’s relative economic size compared to China and 
South Africa, we should expect them to be more or less in the middle on the economic utility-
revisionism scale, perhaps closer to China – depending on how large the development bank 
ends up being in terms of capital.           
 Regarding the point of revisionism, a final and important note is that even though the 
two institutions about to be established represents a significant wakeup call towards the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, both – based on the signals given thus far – will be quite small in 
relation to the IMF and WB and as a result not a direct challenge towards them, at least not in 
the immediate future.  
5.4.2.1 The Development Bank 
Even though the five countries most likely emphasize the relative importance of the bank’s 
two main functions differently, their fundamental interests in establishing the bank seem to be 
overlapping. However, this does not mean that the process is, or have been, particularly 
smooth. Quite the opposite, it seems that there are several conflicts and hurdles that have 
been, and continue to be, central in the process.      
 The main conflict seems to be the issue of the structure of contributions. This is not 
just an issue of how big or small the bank should be. It is just as much an issue of how relative 
power between the BRICS countries will be allocated in the governance of the bank. A big 
bank in terms of capital would mean unequal contributions. For instance, South Africa does 
not have the resources to contribute, say $50 billion, in order for the bank to have a total 
startup capital of $250 billion and equal voting power (there have been no indications that the 
bank will not have a weighted power structure).       
 The first sign of conflict regarding the structure of contributions came in August 2013, 
when an Indian official disclosed that when the issue had been discussed between BRICS 
representatives earlier the same month, China had proposed $100 billion in start-up capital 
and sought a bigger share than the other four countries (Sahu, 2013). Despite this he said that 
the five countries had agreed to contribute with the same amount, and that the total start-up 
capital would be $50 billion (Ibid.). This amount was, as highlighted above, confirmed by 
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BRICS leaders in the beginning of September. However, in St. Petersburg, BRICS leaders did 
not say anything about the structure of individual contributions. Regarding individual BRICS 
members, South Africa is believed to accept unequal contributions, while Brazil and India, 
although not resisting a large bank, insists that the contributions should be equal, in order “to 
avoid that the BRICS Bank will turn into a China-dominated institution” (Stuenkel, 2013c).
 Throughout the spring of 2014, unofficial information regarding the structure of 
contributions has been divergent. In April, a “BRICS source” said that the “share contribution 
is still to be decided” (Kelly and Simao, 2014). In late May, a Brazilian official taking part in 
the negotiations said that “the majority [of the BRICS] wants an equal sharing of the capital 
and there is no other specific proposal on the table” (Soto, 2014). He followed up with saying 
that equal shares will mean start-up capital amounting to $50 billion, where $10 billion is 
given in cash and $40 billion as guarantees. He also said that other countries than the BRICS 
would be allowed to join the bank with a minimum $100 000 share, but that the BRICS would 
hold a minimum of 55% of the bank’s shares (Ibid.).      
 However, only a few days later, on June 5, Indian officials from the Indian finance 
ministry were a bit more sober. Rather than saying that a majority of the BRICS wanted equal 
contributions, they said that India and Brazil wanted it, but “some other countries want to 
have a different structure and higher capital” (The Indian Express, 2014) and that they thus 
where “yet to come to a consensus on … funding” (Ibid.). Contrary to the Brazilian official, 
they also said that they had not concluded whether other countries than the BRICS could 
contribute to the bank.         
 Another central source of conflict is that of location and leadership. Concerning the 
latter, all but Brazil, who will stay out of the discussion “because of upcoming presidential 
elections [scheduled for October 5 2014] that could delay negotiations” (Soto, 2014), have 
expressed a wish to serve as location for the bank. The cities discussed are New Delhi, 
Shanghai, Johannesburg and Moscow. Shanghai is supposedly opposed by Russia and India 
(Stuenkel, 2013c), while Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa, has been the most proactive 
out of the five leaders and has sent letters to his colleagues urging them to let South Africa 
host the bank (Odisha Sun Times, 2014). Regarding leadership, the presidency of the bank 
will rotate between the BRICS in a five-year term (Soto, 2014). In time everyone will thus 
have their turn, but, as with the issue of location, all but Brazil has expressed a wish to have 
the first presidency (The Indian Express, 2014).      
 Given that they are able to take a final decision on capital structure, location, and 
initial leadership, the five countries still need to hash out critical details concerning the bank’s 
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mandate and operating rules. Beyond the issue of membership, central examples are the type 
of projects that will be supported and the type of conditions following a loan. Concerning the 
latter, it is likely that the bank will be relatively soft. The same Brazilian official referred to 
above have also said that, when lending money, “the bank will look into the finances of 
borrowers, but never intervene in their economic affairs” (Soto, 2014). Such issues will 
perhaps be easier to reach a decision in compared to capital structure and location, since it is 
reasonable to assume that there will be fewer special interests clashing, but it is nonetheless 
telling of the long way from idea to a functioning institution.  
5.4.2.2 The Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
The CRA is similar to the bank in that it needs policy coordination in order to become a 
reality, but whereas the bank is very demanding in this regard, the CRA does not face as many 
potential deal breakers and potential sources of conflict. It does not require a physical 
structure, a location, and all the things that come with it, and is not as costly in terms of 
institution building. The relatively speedy decision on contributions, and the fact that there 
haven’t been much indications of conflict afterwards, suggests that the issue of unequal 
contributions and China dominating the others was not particularly controversial. This is not 
very surprising. The way the CRA will be structured Brazil, China, Russia and India all have 
enough power to authorize the disbursement of funds. Only South Africa lack complete 
control (Stuenkel, 2013d).         
 Basically the sources of conflict that remains concerns the operational guidelines, 
especially concerning conditionality. Will there be any? If so, what will they be like – will 
they resemble those of the IMF in any way? Another issue concerns the amount that can be 
disbursed to each country. Shall South Africa be able to utilize as much resources as China, 
even though China is set to contribute almost nine times as much as South Africa? Even 
though no details concerning this has been released yet, it seems – based on the comments of 
Brazil’s Finance Minister Mantega in April – that such issues may soon be resolved. 
5.4.2.3 Gains of defecting 
In general there seems to be few gains to be had by defecting on either the bank or the CRA 
altogether. Regarding the bank, this would only lead to losing the place on the table as well as 
not being able to utilize the functions of the bank, at least not in the way the functions could 
have been utilized by being one of the founders of the bank (depending on the BRICS’ final 
conclusion regarding which countries that are eligible for borrowing and membership). It 
would also mean losing out on a chance to challenge the Bretton Woods Institutions and an 
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elevated position in global governance.        
 In essence, the only “gain” is saving the resources initially allocated for setting up the 
bank. It might be argued that some, for instance the U.S., would be interested in providing 
side payments to one or more of the BRICS to defect. However, given that the bank, at least 
in the close future, will be far too small to represent a direct threat to the WB, this is not very 
likely. The American WB Chief Kim has also publicly backed the initiative, saying that the 
“BRICS bank is quite a natural extension of the need for more investment in infrastructure, 
and we would welcome it” (CCTV.com, 2013). Anyway, it is doubtful that any gain bigger 
than the one which comes from the successful establishment of the Bank, in terms of 
increased access to financing, prestige and change of the status quo, will be bigger than 
sacrificing all this.          
 The issue of setting up the bank thus does not resemble a game of prisoners’ dilemma. 
To some degree you might say that it resembles a situation of stag hunt, where everyone 
cooperating (CC) is the ultimate payoff. But it is not certain that the bank only will 
materialize if everyone cooperates, which is the central caveat in this game. A situation where 
Brazil, India, China and Russia, or another combination of countries, went at it alone is not 
unthinkable. All five countries are not needed to set up the bank. In fact, it might be easier 
without South Africa since the bank then can be both big and democratic (Stuenkel, 2013c). 
And since the gains of defecting are so limited, the difference in payoff between DC, DD and 
CD is also limited, although we should assume the latter to be the least preferable since it 
might mean losing face and prestige on the international arena.    
 Much of the same line of argument applies to the CRA. Cooperating (CC) is the best 
option, and defecting (DC) would not provide any gains, besides saving the resources 
allocated for the arrangement. Moreover, whereas with regards to the the bank there is still a 
slight chance that a potential defector still could utilize its resources, since other emerging and 
developing countries beside the BRICS may be able to borrow from it, this would not be the 
case in the CRA. Further, the argument made above of the structure being too small to really 
represent a threat to the established framework, in this case the IMF, and therefore not being 
something other states or institutions want to provide side payments for in order to avoid 
becoming a reality, applies here as well.        
 A supporting argument in this respect is that IMF Director Lagarde has previously 
welcomed similar reserve pooling arrangements as the CRA, such as the Chiang Mai 
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Initiative Multilateralized (CMIM)
55
 (IMF, 2012c), which Stuenkel (2013d) argues the CRA 
is closely modeled on. Albeit, the CMIM is established within the IMF framework, and 
utilization above 30% of a country’s quota can only take place subject to IMF conditionality. I 
have not been able to identify any substantial comments from Lagarde or the U.S. on the 
CRA, but it is likely that their ultimate reaction depends on whether or not the CRA will be 
established within the IMF framework. Signals thus far suggest that this will not be the case, 
and that the CRA will be autonomous from the IMF (Bretton Woods Project, 2013). 
 Finally, as with the Bank, the CRA can also be established even though one or more of 
the BRICS choose to defect, so it does not really resemble a situation of stag hunt either.   
 In sum, neither prisoners’ dilemma nor stag hunt adequately describes the process of 
establishing the Bank and the CRA. Still, it seems misleading to describe the situation as 
harmony. Even though there are limited gains of defecting – and as a result meeting Oye’s 
(1986) definition of harmony – it is obvious that it is a lot of policy coordination taking place. 
We do not have a situation where the policies of one state automatically facilitate the goal of 
another without any adjustments (Keohane, 1984).      
  In theoretical terms, the best way of describing the process of establishing the Bank 
and the CRA is perhaps with what is called a bargaining problem (Fearon, 1998). A 
bargaining problem “refers to a situation where there are multiple self-enforcing agreements 
or outcomes that two or more parties would all prefer to no agreement, but the parties disagree 
in their ranking of the mutually preferable agreements” (Fearon, 1998, p. 274). This situation 
seems very plausible. Regarding the bank for instance, it seems clear that both India and 
China would prefer to have a bank rather than no bank, even though China’s preferred payoff 
seem to be a large bank where they provide the bulk of the money and have the largest share, 
while India’s preferred payoff seem to be a bank that has equal shares, or at least a bank 
where China do not dominate the others.        
 Regarding the CRA, coordinating the contributions was perhaps not as difficult, but 
they still need to bargain over the operational guidelines, where the countries may very well 
rank the potential agreements differently, for instance with regards to conditionality and rules 
                                                 
55
 The CMIM is a reserve pooling arrangement between the ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN); Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam, in addition to South Korea, China and Japan (collectively known as ASEAN+3). The 
CMIM consists of $240 billion, where China, Japan and South Korea have provided the bulk of the money 
(Asian Century Institute, 2014). Each country has a quota, which is based on the amount of their contribution 
and a multiplier. The smallest countries in the arrangement have a multiplier of 5, while the biggest, China and 
Japan has a multiplier of 0.5. The CMIM can be traced back all the way to 1977, but has only existed in its 
current form since 2010. It has never been used (Ibid.) 
 77 
 
of disbursement.         
 Regardless of the type of game that best describes the process of establishing the bank 
and CRA, the fact that overlapping interests seem to be the case begs the question of regime 
features, which I turn to next.       
5.4.3 Weak regime features 
A central challenge when studying a contemporary political phenomenon, such as the BRICS, 
is that events related to that phenomenon are still unfolding. We should thus be very careful in 
inferring too much from the process of establishing the development bank and the CRA, since 
the five countries might very well be successful in establishing it – and in the process make 
the empirical finding of no robust cooperation between the BRICS that this thesis is built on  
wrong. Nonetheless, especially concerning the bank progress has been limited – no official 
information, beyond details which later has been disputed, has been released since March 
2013 – and, as illustrated above, there are several indications that they have difficulties on 
agreeing on the most central issues.       
 Considering that the attempts at establishing the CRA and the bank mainly seems to be 
a bargaining problem, where the key issue is coordination of several mutually beneficial 
outcomes, and not to overcome fears of being tricked, the most relevant regime feature is 
perhaps decision-making procedures. Institution building is costly and having a platform that 
can facilitate interaction and information sharing may prove decisive.    
 In the beginning of this chapter we saw that the decision-making structures of the 
BRICS framework are rather un-institutionalized. And even though contact between the 
BRICS have trickled down from the offices of their heads of government and state to lower 
level officials and bureaucrats, the decision-making procedures of their framework is limited 
by the boundaries of summits and meetings. There is no secretariat or headquarters that could 
carry out day to day operations, or be a permanent platform for information sharing and 
dialogue. Calls for such a secretariat has however increased as the BRICS trajectory has 
evolved, and in the action plan from the Durban Summit, in March 2013, a BRICS virtual 
secretariat was emphasized in the “New areas of cooperation to be explored” section (BRICS 
2013, n.d.a). Such a secretariat, should it become a reality, would “be an online resource to 
host materials on BRICS activity and enable officials to correspond with each other on 
pressing matters” (Paniev, 2013).         
 This does not mean that a secretariat or something similar is strictly necessary. Sergei 
Storchak, the previously mentioned Deputy Finance Minister of Russia, has for instance said 
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that “I don’t think we will be in big need to set up a separate administrative structure for the 
purpose of developing BRICS as a bloc” (The BRICS Post, 2013c). Nonetheless, it seems 
reasonable to assume that at least the process with the bank would benefit from a bit more 
sophisticated decision-making procedures.      
 Looking at the many joint statements released by finance ministers and state leaders, 
traces of shared principles relevant for the bank and the CRA, as well as towards most issues 
under the reforming IFIs umbrella, can be identified. All five countries seem to converge 
around a shared fundamental principle of the current IFIs being structured in an unjust and 
ineffective way that fails to account for the current state of the world political economy, as 
well as in dealing with the main global economic issues facing the world today. A telling 
quote in this respect is the following, from the New Delhi summit declaration: 
We recognize the importance of the global financial architecture in maintaining the stability and 
integrity of the global monetary and financial system. We therefore call for a more 
representative international financial architecture, with an increase in the voice and 
representation of developing countries and the establishment and improvement of a just 
international monetary system that can serve the interests of all countries and support the 
development of emerging and developing economies. Moreover, these economies having 
experienced broad-based growth are now significant contributors to global recovery (BRICS 
2013, n.d.b). 
Every factor that constitutes a principle; beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude, can be 
identified. They share the notion that the architecture is important and also why it is 
important: it stabilizes and keeps the integrity of the global monetary and financial system 
(beliefs of fact and causation). This is however something that probably most IMF and WBG 
members do. So perhaps most relevant, the BRICS have the same idea about how and why it 
should be reformed: emerging and developing states must be better represented in the 
architecture, because this will lead to an architecture that is in the interests of all states 
(causation), as well as more just (rectitude).        
 The specific issues of the development bank and the CRA can, in addition to the 
principles of a revised and more representative international financial architecture, be linked 
to more trivial principles regarding their economic function. BRICS’ emphasis on the role of 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) has been thoroughly established in the subchapters 
preceding this. It has become a familiar point on the BRICS agenda, and the five countries 
seem to agree on both how and why MDBs are important: they all need development finance 
and MDBs can provide such finance on favorable terms. The following quotes, from the 
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Horsham meeting between BRIC finance ministers in 2009 and the New Delhi summit 
between BRICS leaders in 2012 further underlines this impression: 
We note that the crisis has led to a massive withdrawal of private capital in 2009 and this is 
likely to continue in 2010. It is imperative that multilateral financial institutions should expand 
their lending to offset the massive decline (BRICS 2013, n.d.d). 
In the current global economic environment, we recognise that there is a pressing need for 
enhancing the flow of development finance to emerging and developing countries. (BRICS 
2013, n.d.b). 
BRICS’ emphasis on structures such as the CRA has been less evident, but on a basic level it 
can be argued that it is based on the even more trivial principle of the need for financial 
stability, as a means to continued development and growth. Such a principle has also been 
expressed in various summit and meeting declarations, here represented by a quote from the 
Brasilia summit in 2010:  
We believe that the world needs today a reformed and more stable financial architecture that 
will make the global economy less prone and more resilient to future crises, and that there is a 
greater need for a more stable, predictable and diversified international monetary 
system. (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010). 
Examples of shared norms and rules are harder to come by – both those particular relevant for 
the process of establishing the bank and the CRA and those that are more fundamental in 
nature. This may partly because of a lack of data, but there are some indications that these 
features are weak in the BRICS framework.       
 Ever since the BRIC first met, the countries have emphasized a pragmatic approach to 
their interaction. This approach seems to be guided by commonalities and flexibility rather 
than clear sets of rules and norms. At the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009 for instance, 
BRIC leaders concluded their joint statement by saying that “we have agreed upon steps to 
promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, 
pragmatic, open and transparent way” (Presidential Press and Information Office, 2009). 
Much of the same was also reiterated in Sanya in 2011, after South Africa had joined, when 
BRICS leaders said that “we are determined to continue strengthening the BRICS partnership 
for common development and advance BRICS cooperation in a gradual and pragmatic 
manner, reflecting the principles of openness, solidarity and mutual assistance” (Gov.cn, 
2011).             
 This hardly suggests any binding rules or strong norms guiding the framework and 
their interaction. As opposed to established regimes, there are no BRICS articles of agreement 
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or any formal documents steering their behavior and action. In terms of rules and norms, what 
potentially exist is thus more informal in nature (as of now at least). The seemingly strong 
emphasis on flexibility by the BRICS might also mean that it is too optimistic to expect that 
the BRICS should develop clear prescriptions and proscriptions to guide their joint endeavors, 
but also perhaps a misunderstanding of what the BRICS framework is or ever was meant to 
be.            
 So where does this leave us regarding the Bank and the CRA? Since the attempt at 
policy coordination is still taking place, it is obvious that it is too soon to draw any 
conclusions. This being said, based on the indications of overlapping interests being present, 
as well as basic converging principles regarding why the structures are important, chances are 
that if the BRICS ultimately fail in their attempt at establishing the two structures, significant 
parts of the explanation can be found in weak norms and rules, and perhaps, although to a 
lesser degree, in their un-institutionalized decision-making procedures. 
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis aims to explain what it is that keeps the BRICS from robustly cooperating. To this 
end I have analyzed BRIC(S) interaction towards reforming IFIs, a key issue on the BRICS 
agenda. By drawing on what is described as cooperation theory (Fearon, 1998) three 
hypotheses, that in theory together account for all the potential explanations as to why 
cooperation forms (and not forms), have been posed. The two first hypotheses mainly 
function to establish if the antecedent condition necessary for the third hypotheses’ 
explanation of weak regime features is present.      
 The findings are summarized in table three. Before too much is drawn from this table, 
it is critical to note that the issues differ in their importance. The four final issues under 
increasing the utility of IFIs and the call for a new IMF quota formula are for instance rather 
trivial and by no means decisive observations in this analysis. On the other hand, the ongoing 
attempt at establishing the bank and the CRA are issues that perhaps will make or break 
BRICS interaction and define it in the years to come, and very central for the issue at hand, 
but at the same time issues we cannot infer too much from since they are still unfolding. 
 The antecedent condition of overlapping interests is only found fully in three of the 
issues discussed: in the quid pro quo attempt where the BRICS tried to swap contributions to 
the IMF for assurances of implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms, in establishing the 
development bank and in establishing the CRA. Partly overlapping interests were found in the 
case of identifying and agreeing on an “own” BRICS candidate in both IFI elections, and in 
the case of backing Okonjo-Iweala as WBG Chief. In the issues where interests have been 
overlapping and partly overlapping it seems to be mostly weak rules, norms and to some 
degree un-institutionalized decision-making procedures that explain the failure of successful 
policy coordination.          
 Even though we should not infer too much from the findings stemming from attempts 
at establishing the bank and the CRA, it seems that in sum we have sufficient evidence to say 
that parts of the explanation as to what keeps the BRICS from robustly cooperating are found 
in weak regime features.          
 This being said, the fact that the antecedent condition of overlapping interests is not 
met in several key issues, such as in both IFI reforms from 2010; in increasing the resources 
of the IMF and the WB; in improving the IMF’s surveillance capabilities; and in backing 
Carstens for head of the IMF in 2010, means that it would be misleading to say that the 
BRICS do not robustly cooperate mainly as a result of weak regime features.  
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Table 3 Summary of findings 
Main issue Issue 
Antecedent 
condition met 
Covering 
law present 
(which) Intervening 
variable(s) present 
Increasing 
emerging and 
developing 
economies’ 
influence in IFIs 
2010 IMF reforms No (harmony) n/a n/a 
2010 WBG reforms No (harmony) n/a n/a 
Contribution to IMF 
in return for 
assurance of reform 
implementation 
Yes Partly 
Indication of weak 
rules 
New IMF quota 
formula 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
Increasing the 
utility of IFIs 
Increasing the 
resources of the IMF 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
Increasing the 
resources of the WB 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
Improving the IMF’s 
surveillance 
capabilities 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
Allocation of IMF 
Special Drawing 
Rights 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
IMF to Introduce 
flexible credit 
facilities 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
IMF to study 
international 
monetary system 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
IMF to implement 
new income model 
No (harmony) n/a n/a 
Ending the 
West’s 
stranglehold on 
IFI leader 
positions 
Agreeing on “own” 
BRICS candidate in 
both IFI elections 
Partly Partly 
Indication of weak 
decision-making 
procedures, rules and 
norms 
Backing Carstens 
No 
(incompatible 
interests) 
n/a n/a 
Backing Okonjo-
Iweala 
Partly Partly 
Indication of weak 
rules and norms  
Establishing a 
BRICS 
development 
bank and a 
Contingent 
Reserve 
Arrangement 
Development bank Yes 
Partly (too 
soon to know 
for sure) 
Too soon to evaluate, 
but signs of weak 
rules, norms and to 
some degree decision-
making procedures 
CRA Yes 
Partly (too 
soon to know 
for sure) 
Too soon to evaluate, 
but signs of weak 
rules, norms and to 
some degree decision-
making procedures 
 
Weak regime features are part of the explanation, but harmony of interests also seems to 
explain a lot. Rather than mainly interacting in areas where significant policy coordination is 
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necessary in order to realize mutual interests, the BRICS, in a large degree, seem to have 
merely identified areas where not only interests are compatible, but where policies to a large 
degree already align. They have then advocated these issues jointly and, if necessary, acted 
according to rhetoric. Therefore, a key explanation to the question asked in this thesis is also 
that actual cooperation has been superfluous in the issues where BRICS have interacted. 
 Finally, in the various attempts at coordinating their positions in the IFI leader 
elections, it is partly incompatible interests that describe why their attempts failed, and, in the 
case of backing Carstens, most likely all the explanation.    
 Therefore, we have a situation where we find support for all three hypotheses. 
Assessing the magnitude of the three different reasons is however difficult, since many of the 
issues cannot really be compared directly and since some are still in the works. This being 
said, it seems that harmonious interests might explain a little bit more than weak regime 
features, and that both are more important explanations than incompatible interests. The latter 
finding is not surprising, given that reforming IFIs is the area where BRICS’ interests perhaps 
is most compatible.          
 So, beyond reforming IFIs, what can we infer regarding the whole BRICS framework? 
Concerning BRICS’ role in global governance, this analysis suggests that the five countries to 
a significant degree focus on issues where their gain of interacting might be substantial, but 
still relatively small, and where their autonomous policies might have facilitated the same 
result anyway. This does not mean that we should dismiss the BRICS as something hollow 
and unsubstantial, but it is indicative of the limits of their interaction. This analysis also 
suggests that when overlapping interests are the case, they lack the adequate structures that 
could increase the prospects of successful policy coordination.     
 From a policy perspective – albeit from a different angle than the usual explanation of 
incompatible interests – this analysis confirms the somewhat established notion that it does 
not make sense to (yet) talk about the BRICS as a bloc in international relations. This notion 
may change, however. If the BRICS are successful in establishing the bank and the CRA, they 
will not only transform their informal and flexible relationship to something much more 
committing, but also entrench their position as a key constellation in global governance. 
 This point also reveals the key shortcoming of this thesis: the BRICS framework is a 
phenomenon that is constantly evolving. The empirical premise of no robust cooperation that 
this thesis is built on may not be valid in the long run. This might be the case already in the 
close future, or it can take years. Regardless, the evolving nature of the BRICS framework 
means that there will be a recurrent need for analysis similar to this one. 
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